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INTRODUCTION
This thesis looks at how patients' interests can best
be represented under the current system of health care
financing. Since 1980, major changes in government policy
have put limits on the reimbursement available to providers
under Medicare and Medicaid. These limits made caring for
Medicare, Medicaid, and uninsured patients unprofitable for
providers in most states. This resulted in intensified
competition between providers for profitable patients, which
has altered the way caregiving is organized.
Chapter 1 describes how medical costs rose high
enough to become a problem. It breaks down increases in
costs into two components: increases in input costs and
increase in output intensity, which includes both quality
and quantity of care. Because it is often not known whether
an increase in intensity does more medical good than harm,
these are further broken down into desirable and undesirable
increases by whether they are driven by medical or other
incentives.
Most health care is not paid for by the patient who
receives it. Chapter 2 shows how costs are passed from
providers, through third-party payers, and ultimately to the
public. It attempts to classify cost-containment efforts
before 1980 by where in the payment system they took
effect. This determined what they limited and where funds
they saved could be redistributed. It explains why certain
methods are no longer used, and helps to predict the effects
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of present methods.
The physician's role is crucial in any system of health
care cost containment because he makes most of the decisions
of resource use for individual patients. Chapter 3 shows the
conflict between physicians' professional authority and the
bureaucratic authority of officials of organizations
involved in health care: public health departments,
hospitals, insurance companies, and government reimbursement
regulators. Traditionally, their professional values made
physicians lean toward overuse of resources, while
bureaucrats preferred underuse. This chapter also discusses
how organizations may try to make physicians share their
goal of conserving medical resources.
Chapter 4 describes innovations favored by consumer
health activists in terms of which shift in power they
produce: from bureaucrats to laypeople, from physicians and
other caregivers to patients, or from physicians to other
caregivers. Changes that shift power away from physicians
often use fewer medical resources than physicians would.
This has made such changes popular today with bureaucrats
attempting to contain costs. This chapter also examines how
well the consumer health movement and its goals reflect the
preferences of the rest of the public.
When I began doing research for this thesis, I intended
to identify areas where the interests of patients and cost-
cutters overlapped. I soon found that government cutbacks in
Medicaid and Medicare had widened the split between the
interests of patients with and without adequate insurance,
and that the area of overlap between the interests of the
underinsured and those of cost-cutters had nearly vanished.
Anyone wishing to represent patient interests must now
acknowledge that different patients have different
interests; in this way, the consumer health movement
resembles other movements which have tried to increase some
kind of equality, and have discovered that the uneven
distribution of gains among their members has actually
decreased that kind of equality among them.
Chapter 5 shows that the rise in health-care spending
has slowed down under the new limits on government
reimbursement of providers under the Reagan Administration.
This does not have to result from more cost-effective
methods of delivering care: there is evidence that it may
come from reducing access to care for people with inadequate
insurance. It is also not clear that providers have any
incentive to conserve medical resources used on patients
with adequate private insurance. This suggests 1. that
government rate regulation should cover all third-party
payers, not just Medicare; and 2. that such regulations
should include some way to spread the costs of uncompensated
medical care so that they do not fall so heavily on a few
providers.
Chapter 5 also suggests that consumer health activists
do not need to struggle very much now on behalf of patients
with adequate medical coverage because competition makes
providers willing to conform to their preferences. However,
the proportion of consumers who have adequate medical
coverage is shrinking: unemployment remains high, government
benefits are no longer adequate, and the need for long-term
health care., a service many plans fail to cover, is growing
as hospitals are driven to discharge patients earlier.
Having insurance is no longer enough to guarantee
access to care; because of this, consumer activists must
address the issue of access to care in terms of getting
providers to care for the medically indigent instead of
extending medical coverage to more patients. There is no
legal consensus about to what extent which providers must
give urgently needed care to the indigent. There is also
little in the way of compensation for those providers who
freely give indigent care, so their survival is often
endangered. In terms of quality of care, the most useful
thing consumer activists may be able to do now is to see
that those alternative methods of care which were adopted by
the health care system are not misused.
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CHAPTER ONE: HOW COSTS ROSE SO HIGH
For over ten years, health policy makers have been
trying to deal with the crisis in health care costs. During
the 1970s, most experts were expecting a solution that would
feature some form of national health insurance or a national
health service. Once Ronald Reagan took office, the new
spirit of parsimony revealed a simpler, more direct
solution: to contain health care spending, simply spend a
smaller portion of the budget on it.
Later chapters of this thesis will examine whose health
care costs are now being contained, and why. This chapter
covers a much less controversial topic: how health care
costs rose so high in the first place.
It is generally recognized that there are two major
components in the rise of health care spending. One is the
inflation of costs of inputs; the other is the increase is
the quantity and quality of health care delivered. Martin
Feldstein and Amy Taylor analyzed health care spending from
1950-76,* during which time it rose from $21.66 to $102.33
per U.S. citizen in 1967 dollars. They found only about half
the increase was due to a rise in factor costs, and half of
that rise was due to wages of health care workers catching
up with wages of workers in other economic sectors. The
other half of total health care costs they attributed to
greater intensity of care, in such forms as new employees
and new technology (1).
Rising medical costs are best understood in the context
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of the changes in health care delivery since the turn of the
century; most of them began to rise long before the latest
surge in costs. There have been three changes driving them:
1. the increase in desirable services delivered; 2. the
increase in undesirable services delivered; 3. the increase
in the cost of inputs.
It is necessary to distinguish between desirable and
undesirable increases in services delivered because medical
knowledge is rarely absolute. There are many treatments
whose uncertain benefits must be weighed against uncertain
risks. No one knows exactly which treatments are more
harmful than helpful; over the years many generally accepted
treatments have been found to produce more medical harm than
health.
Now that costs have become a factor to be considered in
medical decision-making, medical services can be undesirable
for two reasons. The traditional reason, which still
matters, is that services that do more medical harm than
good are undesirable. The newly valid reason is that
services that cost more than they are worth are undesirable.
The phrase "services that cost more than they are
worth" sounds simple, but with respect to health care
services it is very ambiguous. An ordinary transaction
involves only two parties, buyer and seller; a health care
transaction often involves a three parties. A provider--such
as a health care professional or facility--sells the
service. The service is typically bought, however, by three
parties: the one who chooses it, who is usually the
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patient's physician; the one who receives the service, who
is the patient; and the one who pays for the service, who is
usually the insurer. The phrase "costs more than it is
worth" raises the questions, "Costs whom?" and "Is worth to
whom?"
A service can cost a doctor time, a patient discomfort,
and an insurer money. The relationship between these three
parties will determine whose costs effectively influence the
decision. The same service can be worth different things to
the three parties who compose the "consumer": the doctor's
benefit might be'a high fee, while the patient's benefit
might be a decrease in the risk of more severe illness. Much
of the controversy over health care policy concerns disputes
over which parties' costs and benefits are decisive in
determining whether society breaks even on a particular
service rendered, given that "society" is a mixture of
doctors, patients, legislators, public health officials,
hospital administrators, health-care facility stockholders,
taxpayers, nurses and many other parties, who are often the
same people in different roles. Thus a service that to some
parties falls in the category of "desirable" is often
"undesirable" to others.
REASONS WHY MORE DESIRABLE SERVICES ARE BEING DELIVERED
1. Demographic change in the American population: Since the
turn of the century the American population has, of course,
grown; it has also grown older. The increased fraction of
the population which is over 65 causes an increase in the
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number and intensity of services delivered because old
people are sicker than young people.
2. More chronic illness: Most of the increase in expected
lifespan over the last century is due to a decrease in
deaths from acute illnesses. That means, among other things,
that people now live long enough to develop chronic
diseases, and that once they have developed them, they can
survive longer with them. Acute illnesses are vulnerable to
fast, cheap measures like vaccination and antibiotics.
Chronic illnesses now use 80% of all medical expenditures,
because they require expensive measures like open-heart
surgery and long-term skilled nursing care (2).
3. technological progress: This is related to the increase
in chronic disease. Until the twentieth century, doctors
could do very little for any kind of disease. It is now
clear that the great conquest of the major nineteenth-
century causes of death, the acute illnesses, was due more
to such public health measures as clean water than to
medical interventions like inoculation (3).
After World War II, a burst of progress was fueled by
vastly increased spending on medical research and
development. Although this had little effect on mortality
statistics before 1968, it had great success in reducing
pain, disfigurement and disability. From 1968 to 1975, death
rates dropped 14%. The causes of death which did not
decrease in frequency were those which require more of a
social than a medical solution, such as homicide, suicide,
and to some extent, cirrhosis of the liver (4).
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4. Broader medical insurance coverage: Health care spending
rose from 4.4% of the gross national product in 1950 to
10.8% in 1963 (5). It is quite likely that this could not
have been financed by individual patients, who now pay only
24% of costs (6). Right after World War II, only about a
fifth of the U.S. population had health insurance. By 1975,
a combination of government and private insurance paid two-
thirds of all medical bills (7).
During the Depression, hospitals and doctors had
trouble finding enough paying patients to keep themselves in
business (8). They set up nonprofit insurance companies to
supply them with patients. Hospitals formed Blue Cross
agencies in each state, which insured subscribers for their
hospital expenses; doctors, more slowly, formed state
agencies of Blue Shield, to provide coverage of physician
bills.
Then came World War II, with its wage and price
freezes. These made it difficult for employers to attract
good employees in the wartime labor shortage. In 1942, The
War Labor Board decided to allow fringe benefits up to 5% of
wages, so employers began offering health insurance coverage
instead of the raises they could not give. During the war,
the population covered by hospital insurance grew from
under 7 million to about 26 million (9).
After the war, employers didn't need to give health
insurance instead of raises, but insurance was still an
attractive bargaining chip because it was tax-free "income"
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to the worker. Labor unions were also glad to have a new
benefit they could win for their members. By 1954, 60% of
the population had some form of hospital coverage., and
commercial insurers had more subscribers than Blue Cross and
Blue Shield (10).
At this time, to have insurance, you needed either a
fairly good job--to provide it as a fringe benefit--or
enough income or wealth from other sources to buy individual
insurance. In 1958, 78% of households whose heads were fully
employed had health insurance. Of households whose heads
were retired, only 43% had insurance; where the household
head was a temporary laborer, only 36% had insurance. If the
household head was a housewife or disabled, the chances of
having insurance fell to 32% and 29% respectively (11).
In 1965, Congress amended the Social Security Act to
provide 3 levels of coverage for groups seen as needy.
Medicare Part A provided compulsory hospital coverage to the
elderly under Social Security. Medicare Part B subsidized
voluntary insurance to cover physician's bills, also for the
elderly. Medicaid., which was added as a sort of
afterthought, expanded assistance to the states so that they
could provide health coverage for the poor (12).
By 1974, 89% of the population had insurance; by 1982 it
had levelled off at around 91% (13). Since then, it has
fallen slightly, due to Medicaid cutbacks and the withdrawal
of fringe benefits by employers (14).
5. The growth of the hospital's role in healing: At the turn
of the twentieth century, the hospital was a special kind of
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almshouse where the poor went to die. In 1930, only 1 out
of 16 doctors worked in a hospital; 40% of doctor visits
took place in the patient's home. In 1935, half of all the
births attended by doctors still took place at home. By the
1950s, 96% of all births took place in hospitals (15).
The public image of hospitals, as any typical day and
night of television will show, changed to something of a
cross between a slightly ascetic hotel and a scientific
laboratory. Now that most people had insurance and the
hospital had become the home of the miracle cure, patients
were willing to go there whenever their doctor ordered them
to do so.
6. The medicalization of services: Births and deaths were
not the only life events moved to hospitals. Medicine
extended its territory to include social problems like
alcohol and drug addiction. Many patients in mental
hospitals were redefined by "deinstitutionalization" as
nursing-home clients, and joined by other aged people who
had formerly lived outside of institutions, but found
nursing homes the best solution for their needs for care
once Medicaid was extended to cover them (16).
It is unclear what proportion of health care visits
have always been for nonmedical things like sympathy,
reassurance, or help in facing death. It is likely that
these have increased as wider medical insurance enabled
people who could not afford explicit psychiatric treatment,
or whose values blocked that path for them, to go to medical
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services with physical complaints created by emotional
needs (17).
Though services providing for long-term care and
emotional needs are probably ones society is willing to pay
for, there are probably cheaper ways of providing them than
through the health-care system. As of 1981, 70"4 of nursing-
home clients were paying for their care by Medicaid, which
accounted for half of all nursing-home revenues (18).
REASONS WHY MORE UNDESIRABLE SERVICES ARE BEING DELIVERED
1. the technological imperative: Once a new medical
technique is developed, the professional ethic of medicine
encourages practitioners to use it without questioning
whether it costs more than other treatments. Doctors are
trained to perform any service that might improve their
patients' health by any amount. A recent study found that
doctors trained in more academically-oriented medical
schools and hospitals ordered more diagnostic tests than
others did (19).
Expensive equipment that is bought to lower costs rarely
produces the savings expected by its buyers, because it
receives more use than the old method because of the very
advantages that inspired its purchase, which are usually
either easier operation or higher quality of service. The
increased use increases total services delivered, which
raises society's health care expenses. The equipment also
has little resale value once a newer version renders it
obsolete, because all health-care providers want to use only
the latest and best techniques (20).
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2. perverse economic incentives of fee-for-service:
Physicians usually bill their patients by the number and
kind of services delivered, rather than by some unit, like
years of treatment, which would encourage them to restrict
services. If patients were billed a flat fee for each year
of all necessary treatment, as HMO patients are, physicians
would have no financial incentive to perform extra services.
Under the fee-for-service system, the more services that a
doctor performs, the higher his bill can be.
Doctors' performance of extra services for extra pay can
also result in overuse of other resources. As of the mid-
1970s, a doctor could earn 50-60% more for hospital than for
office time, because he could see more patients in an hour
(21). This gave doctors a nonmedical reason to send their
patients to hospitals. That they sometimes do hospitalize
patients for nonmedical reasons is shown by the finding that
hospital admissions rise when there are fewer doctors per
capita--and doctors wish to cut their workload--or when the
number of empty hospital beds is high (22). Given their
incentive to overuse resources, it is important to remember
that while their own fees only account for 18% of medical
bills, the services they order for their patients generate
about 70% of all health-care costs (23).
3. Market imperfections: As described above, the buyer of
health-care services can include three parties: doctor to
choose, patient to receive, and insurer to pay for the
service. The chain can be extended to include the employer
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who buys insurance, or the politician who decides who shall
be eligible for government insurance and must answer to
those among his constituency who vote and pay taxes.
Which services will be delivered depends, in its
simplest form, on the choices of doctors, the consent of
patients, and the willingness of insurers to pay for a given
service. One of the solutions often proposed to the problem
of rising health care costs is to make the health care
market function more like an economist's perfect market by
making patients pay more of the costs of the medical care
they receive.
Unfortunately, a perfect market requires consumers to
have perfect information about the quality and price of the
good being traded. The trouble with the cost-sharing
solution is that patients don't know very much about what
care and how much of it they need; this is both a cause
and a result of the power of the medical profession.
Physicians know something about the quality of care they
deliver. Insurers know less, but have considerable
experience with medical bills which gives them some
knowledge of norms and trends. Patients know least and are
told little about the medical facts of their treatment and
even less about its cost, because doctors know very little
of other providers' costs and are forbidden by professional
norms from advertising their own rates (24).
Also, in a perfect market no single buyer or seller is
able to influence prices. In the health-care market, there
are large buyers, like Medicaid, Medicare, Blue Cross, and
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Blue Shield, and even some large, self-insured employers,
who are big enough to get discount prices from providers.
For instance, for many years the costs of treating uninsured
patients have been spread over paying patients. However.,
they were not added to Medicare and Medicaid bills, because
the federal government is a strong enough buyer to prevent
this.
Similarly, some providers are able to dictate prices to
at least some of their customers. Patients who want to
maintain a relationship with a family doctor cannot really
comparison-shop for a hospital, because each doctor has
admitting privileges at a Limited list of hospitals. There
also is evidence that doctors can set their own prices (25).
Even in terms of insurance, patients rarely negotiate the
terms of their coverage, because they get their insurance
through an employer who offers them, at most, several plans,
each of which already has fixed terms.
4. Capital spending: Most hospitals are still privately
owned, nonprofit organizations. One economic model of
hospital costs says that increased demand, from the various
reasons already discussed, led to higher prices because the
supply of medical services is relatively fixed in the short
run. Thus, for the same quantity of product, costing the
hospital the same price to produce, the hospital could
charge a higher price. This it did, generating a surplus for
90". of all voluntary hospitals. Not being for-profit
companies, they had no owners of equity to absorb the
15
surplus, so they reinvested them in expanded services ( 26).
It is plausible that the actions of nonprofit hospitals
could have an effect on the whole health care industry,
because they provide about two-thirds of all acute hospital
care (27). However, I find the above theory unconvincing,
because it does not explain why nonprofits raised their
prices when their costs were not increasing. For me, capital
spending is sufficiently explained by the technological
imperative, the relocation of the medical encounter from the
home or office to the hospital, and the growing pressure to
develop and follow professional norms.
5. Pressure to develop and follow professional norms:
Physicians have traditionally considered medicine "more of
an art than a science." This is their response to the doubts
engendered by the wide variation in treatment techniques
between different practitioners. However, in recent years
physicians have been under some pressure to choose the
currently most widely accepted option. Some of the pressure
comes from third-party payers, who use the new accumulation
of data on the varieties of practice to determine which
variety is in fact currently the most widely accepted.
Much more pressure comes from the fear of malpractice suits,
against which the strongest defense is that the disputed
procedure was performed in accordance with the medical norm.
In 1976, the AMA declared a crisis in the malpractice
situation. They surveyed their members and found that three-
fourths of them practiced what is called "defensive
medicine": to conform to professional norms they ordered
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more diagnostic tests and procedures than they personally
considered necessary. Nearly 60% of office-based
practitioners claimed to have raised their fees due to the
rising costs of malpractice insurance. Over 20% of them had
stopped performing procedures seen as particularly risky--
not because they could harm the patient but because they
could lead to a lawsuit. Some insurers refused to offer
insurance covering such procedures, at least for doctors who
had bad records with them (28).
REASONS FOR THE INFLATION IN INPUT COSTS
1. Increased
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doctor charges the same fee for "supervising" a treatment as
for performing it himself (29). They are not even returned
to the hospital in which the doctor practices if he is not
on salary, since patients receive separate bills for private
physicans' and hospitals' services.
2. Increase in the cost of nonphysician labor: The health
care industry employs about 4.3 million workers, making it
the second largest employer industry in the nation (30).
This represents a large growth in the proportion of the
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population that works in health care: more people are
becoming hospital patients now than before 1950; and the
number of health workers per hospital patient rose from 1.78
in 1950 to 3.04 in 1976 (31).
Except for those of physicians, wages of health care
workers lagged behind those of workers in other sectors
during the postwar period of hospital growth., partly due to
a lack of union bargaining power, which in turn owed much to
strong public sentiment against workers who withheld their
lifesaving services during strikes. The 1960s brought new
militancy to many workers, such as civil service employees,
whose jobs were previously thought too essential to allow
them the privilege of striking. The strong economy of this
decade meant there was enough money around for some of it to
go to service workers; health-care workers, whose industry
was flooded with Medicare and Medicaid dollars, finally
caught up with the rest of the workforce and inflation (32).
3. Monopoly power: There are two kinds of monopoly power
which inflate prices of inputs to the health care industry.
One is the professional power of physicians to restrict the
right to practice medicine and to control most health-care
purchasing decisions. I will discuss this more fully in
Chapter 2, under the subject of physician as gatekeeper and
professional.
For now, the major ways in which the profession can inflate
prices are by: controlling the supply of physicians by
credentialling and by restricting practice by physician
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substitutes; controlling their own fee structure;
monitoring the quality of their own services through the
peer review system; and controlling the choice of which
facilities are used by their referrals, even in cases where
financial interest in facilities creates a conflict of
interest for individual practitioners (33).
The other kind of monopoly power comes from the
increasing corporatization of other health-care providers, a
trend which has been accelerated by the effort during the
1970s to avoid duplication of services. This effort was
intended to decrease costs by letting only the most
efficient providers supply services requiring capital
expenditures; unfortunately, it conflicted with basic
antitrust principles by restricting competition between
providers and encouraging the creation of local service
monopolies.
4. Organizational slack: This is a
parties that have to pay medical
defined a variety of sources of it
that any industry run on a nonprofit
efficiently by managers experienced i
For instance, the results of
intensive care units at 16 hospitals
patients in the are 'too healthy' or
from their unique services," which i
to $1,000 a day (34). In 1973, an
favorite target of all
bills, and they have
Their consensus is
basis could be run more
n for-profit industry.
a university study of
suggest that "20-25'4 of
'too sick' to benefit
nclude beds costing up
insurer found that by
simplifying a transfer form from a hospital to an extended-
care facility, and by extending coverage to include the
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extended-care facility, it could save on total bills and end
need for a hospital expandsion plan (35).
Commercial insurance companies and large corporations
have begun hiring auditors to check hospital bills. They
have found overcharges on 90"4 of large bills checked,
leading the president of the Washington Business Group to
accuse hospitals of "utter statistical incompetence" (36).
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CHAPTER TWO: COST CONTAINMENT ATTEMPTS BEFORE 1980
This chapter will be limited to discussion of the
attempts made to cut health care costs before 1980. Until
then, efforts were still being made to increase access to
care by needy groups, like the poor and the elderly. Because
of that constraint., would-be cost cutters were more
restricted than their contemporary counterparts are. Efforts
since 1980 to cut costs will be discussed in Chapter 5.
This chapter classifies cost-containment measures by
the point in the chain of responsibility to pay, as shown in
Figure 2-1, at which the decision is made about which
services to cut. In this scheme, allocation of health-care
resources can be done by the insurer, the provider, or the
patient. A fourth level is that of the supplier of capital
to providers. This is not included in Figure 2-1, which
shows how health services actually rendered are financed,
not how capital expenditures by providers are financed.
CONTAINMENT AT THE LEVEL OF CAPITAL SUPPLY:
There are three major resources on whose expansion the
health care system spends most of its capital: knowledge,
which is expanded by research; physicians, whose number is
increased by spending on medical schools and scholarships;
and facilities, which include beds, buildings, and specific
equipment.
Hospitals can have three major forms of ownership. Most
U.S. hospitals are privately owned, nonprofit entities, also
known as voluntary hospitals. A small number are privately
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How costs are passed down to the public
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This is a simplified model of how hospital and doctors'
charges are passed down to the public. It does not
include charges paid by individual patients for their
own health care and insurance. It shows who is held
responsible for cost increases by the party just below
it. Pressure for cost containment moves up the chart
when the lower of two parties resists a passed-along
increase.
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Figure 2-1
owned, for-profit entities. The remainder are publicly owned
by federal, state or local governments.
Regardless of their ownership, most hospitals receive
some government aid for investment. Some of this comes in
the form of direct grants and loans, which financed much
hospital expansion from 1948 to 1974, under the Hill-Burton
Act (1). Other aid comes in the form of tax subsidies,
through income tax deductions for philanthropic
contributions and for interest earned on tax-exempt hospital
or municipal bonds.
Most medical education and research take place at
medical schools, laboratories, and teaching hospitals, which
also receive government support in the form of direct grants
and tax subsidies. In addition, government payments for
health care include an allowance for capital spending.
After World War II the government poured huge sums of
money into expanding the supply of hospital beds, medical
knowledge, and physicians. When the government first began
to try to lower costs, it concentrated on halting the
increase in hospital beds it had previously encouraged.
Next, studies began to show that physicians' fees might rise
rather than fall as their numbers increased, so programs to
aid their education were somewhat cut back (2).
Eventually a third connection came into focus: that
between technological progress and rising costs. Its precise
mechanism is still not clear, but its effect has made it
quite acceptable to-denounce technological breakthroughs as
being wasteful of health care resources.
Little has yet been said about at which level savings
from not doing heart transplants would be reallocated to
other uses. The uses usually discussed in this context are
things like primary and preventive health care for children
or food for starving people; there are, however, only two
levels where funds not spent on heart transplants can be
transferred to what may be seen as more pressing social
needs--if we manage to agree on what those may be. One is
the government, at any of its own levels; before 1980, the
idea of funds being redistributed to meet social needs was
fairly plausible. The other level is that of the provider,
can increase its share of care of people without
insurance, for instance, if it doesn't have to buy the
latest advance in magnetic resonance imaging.
In addition to its government sources, the health care
industry has access to private capital markets for its
capital expenditure needs. Here for-profit entities have the
advantage over nonprofits, because they can sell equity as
well as bonds, which gives them more control over their
spending decisions. Bonds require approval by boards of
directors, and in the case of public hospitals, by local
residents and public officials.
Another way that government can control capital spending
is to limit not the supply of money, but the avenues of
spending it. Most of what was called "health planning" in
the 1970s consisted of forcing providers to justify their
large capital expenditures to government officials, who
would then decide to grant or withhold "Certificates of
which
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Need" without which available funds could not be spent,
whatever their source.
The first Certificate of Need programs were enacted in
the 1960s, by state governments staggering under the demands
for their share of Medicaid payments. In 1974, Congress
passed a law requiring all states to have a Certificate of
Need (CON) program by 1980. Each state was to divide itself
into health service areas and to create a Health Systems
Agency (HSA) to make health plans for it. HSAs were to be
nonprofit entities with a consumer majority on their
governing boards, and memberships that were socially and
economically representatvie of their area (3).
State governments were not always pleased about the
national CON program; local consumer control sometimes
involved restricting the power of more traditional local
government bodies (4). The CON program had other problems as
well. It was easy to circumvent: approval was only required
on purchases priced over $100,000, so anything that could be
billed in subunits falling under that limit passed through.
Ultimate approval was given by state governments, who were
free to reject the HSAs' recommendations.
A 1960 study determined that the U.S could save $1
billion a year by eliminating duplication in 4 categories:
CAT scanners, facilities for open-heart surgery and cardiac
catheterization, radiation therapy units, and supply of
general hospital beds. However, the indirect costs of CON
programs, and of moving patients around to the more limited
2e
number of service sources', would reduce or wipe out the
gain. The study recommended reduction of demand for
services, which has in fact become the strategy for the
1980s (5).
CONTAINMENT AT THE LEVEL OF THE PROVIDER
Varieties of cost containment differ at this level by
which unit of spending they control. Simple price controls,
like those imposed by Nixon in the early 1970s, are applied
to the unit by which costs are billed, which is usually the
service (6).
Another method, used by the British National Health
Service, is to apply control at the hospital level; each
British hospital's budget is fixed at the beginning of each
year. In this system that nation is able to have free
medical care for all for a much smaller share of its GNP
than the U.S. spends on health care. The tradeoff comes in
the limits of that free care: patients needing elective
surgery wait on long lists for it, and capital spending is
put off longer than American standards would allow (7).
During the 1970s there was much hope that the correct
unit for containment had been found: the individual patient.
Most innovative types of provider organizations, including
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Individual
Practitioner Associations (IPAs), bill each of their
patients a flat fee for a year of health care. In this
arrangement, the provider assumes the risk and function of
an insurer. The problem so far seems to be that, unlike
insurance companies, few health care providers can deliver
services over a large geographic area, such as a whole state
or the nation. For this reason, corporations whose employees
are distributed throughout large geographical areas do not
want the administrative headache of negotiating contracts
with a different HMO or IPA in each of their plant
locations, so they prefer traditional insurance companies.
Unions as well as employers object to HMOs, because
HMOs negotiate directly with employers, bypassing the
collective bargaining process. This may explain why HMOs
are more likely to be found in nonunionized firms (8).
There is a fourth unit of health care which was not
used before 1980, although the concept was being developed
during the end of the 1970s. That is the episode of illness,
a unit difficult to define, in theory. In practice, the
hospital admission has turned out to be the most manageable
unit for purposes of calculating permissible costs for
inpatient hospital care. Diagnosis-related group (DRG) is
the name given to the payment unit for this system; each
admission results in one major diagnosis by time of
discharge; this is combined with other facts about the
patient, including age and secondary diagnoses, to assign
the admission to one of several hundred standard
groups.
I will describe the DRG system more completely in
Chapter 5. In this theoretical scheme of cost-containment
units I will only stress that the unit of the episode of
illness presents a great many administrative problems, which
probably made it impossible to use before the present state
of information-handling technology made it financially
practical. Previously it would have cost more to administer
than it could have saved. Also, it is still not clear how it
can be applied to outpatient visits, which far outnumber the
episodes of illness that generate them, especially for
chronic illnesses.
Cost-containment at the provider level has different
effects on physicians and health care facilities, depending
on which unit is constrained. Physicians find that if a unit
other than the service is used for billing, there is an
economic incentive for the provider to provide fewer
services than are necessary. If the constraint is on the
per-patient charge, the physician will be bearing some
financial risk. Physicians in these forms of
either proprietors or salaried employees. Th
have an incentive to skimp on services, so t
peer review to see that they don't do so, an
that they don't waste resources. If the con
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such an incentive. It does so through peer review which
concentrates on making sure that physicians are not
wasteful; in this case they can be trusted to maintain their
own quality standards. In either case, doctors resent peer
review as interference with their right to practice in
accordance with their professional judgement about what is
best for the patient's welfare.
Unfortunately, peer review was one of the major
components of cost-containment strategies of the 1970s and
is becoming even more important now. The first Professional
Review Standards Organizations (PSROs) were authorized by a
1972 federal law. This created 200 local physician
which were to review all
hospital stays by Medicare patients, to
resources used were necessary. They also had
to maintain standards of quality, but few of
went to that end (9.
What physicians would prefer as a focus
costs would be to concentrate on their
particular, those of malpractice insurance.
admissions and
make sure all
a responsiblity
their resources
for containing
own costs--in
The AMA set
about "reforming" not medical, but legal practice.
succeeded in changing many insurance regulations and
statutes: 41 states, for example, shortened their statutes
of limitations for malpractice suits (10).
Hospitals also are subject to malpractice suits; some
have attempted to prevent them by giving patients less
drastic means of showing dissatisfaction. This led to what
success there was for the patient representative program, a
reform urged by the consumer rights movement which will be
discussed in Chapter 4. This approach tried to discourage
malpractice suits by increasing quality of care, as
perceived by patients (11).
corporations
It
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COST CONTAINMENT AT THE LEVEL OF THE INSURER:
Public and private insurers use many of the same
measures to lower the fees they must pay to medical
providers. Before 1980, they did little to specify how
providers should treat patients, except in broad categories.
Patients--and so, to some degree, providers--were informed
in advance for which facilities and services insurers would
pay. During the 1970s, for instance, there was a gradual
expansion of insurance coverage for procedures performed on
an outpatient basis; this paralleled an expansion of
providers' ideas of which procedures could safely be
performed on an outpatient basis.
Within broad categories, insurers might influence a
provider's decisions about how to treat a particular
patient: for example, a doctor might not discharge a patient
from the hospital if the patient had no coverage for
extended care, even if the full intensity of hospital care
was no longer needed. Yet the tradition of fee-for-service
payment meant that most treatment decisions were up to the
physician's judgment. The size of the fee paid for the
service was usually up to the provider as well, since even
government insurers were unwilling to meddle with the power
of physicians, for fear of creating or perpetuating a "two-
tiered medical system" in which the poor received cheaper
and inferior treatment.
This meant that reimbursements to providers were
usually determined by what providers reported as their costs
for treatment already rendered, and thus were retrospective.
The DRG, admission-based payment system is prospective,
telling providers in advance what they will receive for
treating a particular case. Cost control schemes based on a
fixed yearly payment per hospital or per year are also
prospective, but they leave the provider more leeway to
allocate the payments they receive. An HMO, for instance,
can decide which of its subscribers' illnesses require more
resources on a purely medical basis; a hospital under DRGs
has that spelled out by its insurer.
One early experience with prospective payment involved
nursing homes, in the early days of Medicaid coverage of
their fees. States had the power to decide on what basis to
reimburse providers; unlike hospitals most nursing homes are
and have always been privately owned and for-profit. Most
states originally reimbursed them on a flat rate per day,
statewide. The result was hardship for those with higher
costs and windfall profits for those with lower costs. This
gave nursing homes a clear incentive to provide the minimum
care they could get away with. Both Medicaid administrators
and conscientious nursing-home operators sought an
alternative, and came up with cost-based retrospective
payment. By 1978, all states were required to adopt a cost-
based, retrospective payment system to intermediate care
facilities under Medicaid (12).
There is a distinction between the powers ofgovernment
and private insurers as bearers of costs. Private insurers,
Medicare, and Medicaid can all stop the passing of the
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health care bill down to employers and the general public,
by restructuring the incentives faced by providers. However,
private insurers can redistribute health care resources only
between services, types of facilities, and their
stockholders, if they are commercial insurers. The
government has the power to redistribute resources between
categories of patients, by defining who qualifies for
government insurance. Ultimately, Congress and the state
legislatures have the power to distribute funds between
health and other human needs.
CONTAINMENT AT THE PATIENT LEVEL:
Containment at the patient level requires patients to
make more health care decisions. In this, its supporters
resemble those of the consumer health movement, as in that
they both call patients "consumers". Beyond these points,
there is a great difference between those who favor a "free
market" in health care, and those who favor giving patients
more rights and powers. I will discuss these differences in
Chapter 4, in reference to the consumer health movement.
In order for there to be a free market in health care,
patients would need a great deal more information than they
now have about their needs and the quality of care offered
by different providers. Someone has to bear the costs of
getting that information to consumers. Unless patients do
most of that work, thereby taking on new costs, some
intermediary will have to learn all the relevant information
and advise the patient on those parts of it which apply to
his or her situation. That is precisely what the doctor's
=
role is in our present, imperfect medical market.
Free market supporters may not openly wish to shift
information costs to patients; they do., however, wish to
shift financial costs from insurers and employers to
patients. They oppose cost control involving redistribution
of resources by government, either at the insurer or capital
supplier level, as an interference in choices of the general
public as taxpayers, consumers, workers, and patients. They
consider the general public biased by present insurance
coverage in favor of all the care it can get without having
to pay for it. They are not concerned that letting the
individual consumer decide how to allocate his own health
care dollars decreases the risk-sharing benefits of
allocation on a group level.
The three methods most often advised to shift financial
costs to the patient are modifications of current forms of
insurance: the deductible, which is an amount of medical
charges below which the patient must bear the whole cost;
coinsurance, in which the patient pays a fixed percent of
all bills; and copayment, in which the patient pays a fixed
amount on all bills. Unfortunately, it is administratively
and politically difficult to set financial costs high
enough to influence middle-class people without pricing
health care out of poor people's reach.**46 Whatever pricing
system is set, middle-class people will tend to reduce
their financial burden by buying more insurance from
private sources. Two-thirds of Medicare enrollees buy Part
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B, the voluntary insurance that covers bills not covered by
compulsory Part A. Even in Britain., those who can afford it
now buy private health insurance, which enables them to
avoid the waiting lists of National Health Service patients.
It is important to remember that the health care system
is like a giant Rube Goldberg machine, in which a minor
change in who pays for a service can cause major,
unpredictable changes in the amount and kind of some other
service being performed. A typical example of such a
surprise is the event now known as the
deinstitutionalization of inmates of mental hospitals.
Between 1956 and 1982, the number of residents in
American mental hospitals dropped from 565,668 to 209,449.
The predominant explanation for this was that new drugs were
discovered and introduced which could chemically control
behavior. These made it possible to safely discharge many
patients and treat them on an outpatient basis. Another
explanation is that a 1956 amendment to Social Security
increased the federal aid states could get for maintaining
inmates of nursing homes. Many inmates of mental hospitals
needed only custodial care and may never have been
mentally ill at all, just aged and frail. Most inmates of
mental hospitals were in state institutions where,
naturally, it cost the state money to support them. By
transferring them to nursing homes, some of the cost of
supporting people needing custodial care was transferred
from the state to the federal government (14).
This example of change is typical of those in the
health care system in that it is hard to attribute the
relative importance of three causes, which in this case
are: 1. technological progress (new drugs), 2. a change in
financing (increased federal support for nursing homes), and
3. a shift of public opinion and support. The shift in
public willingness to support mental hospitals came from
reformers who wanted to reintegrate the mentally ill into
the "community."
This motive became much more prominent in the 1960s and
1970s when many social services were relocated to local
providers under community control. In some cases, like the
deinsitutionalization of mental hospital inmates, the
centralized institutions were dismantled, but no community
provider was created to take over its work. Consequently,
this change led to further unexpected results, like the
nursing-home scandals of the 1970s and the current discovery
of the "homeless."
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PHYSICIAN AS GATEKEEPER AND PROFESSIONAL
The physician plays a crucial role in the U.S health
care system, as the person who controls the quality,
quantity, and nature of health care services being
delivered. Attempts to contain costs have little chance of
success iF they do not influence the behavior of physicians
in their role as gatekeepers of access to medical services.
Attempts to maintain quality of care need doctors'
expert knowledge and professional authority to monitor care
on behalf of patients.
This chapter will first examine the physician in his
original role as the prototypical professional acting as an
agent for his client, the patient. In this two-party
relationship, the only incentives that drive physicians'
choices are their personal ones, which include professional
ideals and values, economic goals, and individual
sociopolitical beliefs.
As doctors expanded the medical domain and their power
within it, they gained control of most health-care
purchasing decisions. This gave third-party payers a reason
to look for ways to change physicians' incentives so that
keeping costs down would become a factor in their decision-
making. Some methods have aimed at individual physicians,
but the more promising ones try to incorporate the physician
into an organization and make the organization find ways to
control him.
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In discussing these, I will examine situations in which
physicians act as certifiers and must consider the interests
of parties other than themselves and patients. The physician
acts as gatekeeper to other benefits besides health care.
He is the final authority on who is sick and who is well for
all purposes, including employment, military service, and
legal compensation. Because of this, organizations which
rely on physicians' definitions of illness have looked for
ways to modify their decisions in the organizations' favor.
THE PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT AS PROFESSIONAL AND CLIENT
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The autonomy of the physician encourages both patients
and physicians to hold some questionable beliefs. As part of
their medical training, doctors are initiated into a
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subculture of very high status and taught to make life-and-
death decisions. They learn to accept total responsibility
for their actions, some of which must inevitably be fatal
mistakes. To maintain high enough confidence to continue
"playing God," they come to believe that since they are
their own harshest judges, they are also their only
legitimate judges (2).
Many patients accept this: illness brings out the child
in some, who want their doctor to take all responsibility
for healing them (3). Other patients experience a placebo
effect, in which any action performed or recommended by the
doctor makes them feel better. Some patients, particularly
those suffering chronic illnesses, must change their
lifestyle if they are to improve their health; physicians
tend to think that only their authority as experts can
convince these patients to follow "doctor's orders" (4).
The traditional difference in power between doctors and
their patients is so great that, until recently, the
physician had more legal protection from his client than the
client had from his physician (5).
One of the major results of the consumer health
movement was the research it inspired about the role of the
physician's authority in achieving patient compliance with a
health regimen. The consensus reached by researchers has
been that compliance is best when patients and doctors
speak clearly, frankly, and in detail to each other (6).
This seems self-evident, but professional authority has
traditionally blocked communication between doctors and
patients. Physicians are reluctant to invite patients'
requests, fearing they will be large and unreasonable,
moreso than they usually turn out to be (7). Some physicians
take questions as accusations of their incompetence, and
think of questioners as "difficult" patients (8).
Meanwhile, patients are often already made timid and
anxious by their symptoms and fears. When doctors still made
house calls, patients could at least meet them on home turf;
now nearly all encounters take place in hospitals or
doctors' offices, further intimidating the patient. To make
matters worse, the doctor usually prescribes treatment just
after giving his diagnosis. Thus, by the time the patient
receives his instructions, he is often too upset to
understand or remember them (9). Even nontechnical phrases,
like, "This will only hurt a little," have been found to
mean very different things to doctors and patients (10).
Family members could be useful here, since they are likely
to remain calmer and to be able to aid the patient's
compliance with orders; unfortunately, most outpatient
visits do not include family members (11).
So far, we have seen that well-intentioned physicians'
efforts to communicate with patients can be thwarted by the
very authority that -is the basis of patients' faith in them.
The successful physician must be able to tell whether a
particular patient wants him to appear omniscient or subject
to human error; if he chooses the wrong behavior he will not
be able to get full information or compliance from the
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patient.
A medical education includes indoctrination in a whole
set of professional values. One of those values is the
ethical code society expects all members of the profession
to follow as a condition of their continued autonomy. To
fulfill his role as agent on behalf of his patient, the
ideal physician is expected to: 1. provide therapy wherever
he diagnoses illness; 2. do everything possible for each
patient; 3. assume he has access to unlimited resources, or
at least that all resources that are currently present are
available to every patient; 4. treat each patient as an
individual case, never weighing one
resources against that of any other pati
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preventive medicine to "preventive welfare," which supplies
fundamentals like food and housing (13).
Doctors also have preferred types of patients. The ideal
hospital patient, for instance, is cheerful, undemanding,
and capable of full cooperation with hospital routines; as
the source of this description points out, this does not
sound like a person sick enough to be in a hospital (14).
Aside from all these professional values, which
medical students receive along with their other training,
the physician has his individual values from the other
aspects of his experience. Some of these are also widespread
in the profession: most doctors are middle or upper-class,
and it has been found that they share information more
freely with patients close to their own social level (15).
As we saw in Chapter 1, the fee-for-service system rewards
practitioners for being lavish with medical resources.
Finally, there are sociopolitical values that shape doctors'
practices, like their views on abortion or the relative
worth of the lives of people of varying ethnic backgrounds
or ages (16).
THE PHYSICIAN AS GATEKEEPER TO MEDICAL SERVICES
Physicians are gatekeepers to medical services because
they have a monopoly on prescribing most medicine and
performing all the medical services they are willing to do.
They are the dominant profession in medicine, controlling
and defining all other medical professions, from pharmacist
to nurse's aide. Another face of this dominance is their
ability to classify a profession as not being "medical" if
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they cannot control it. Social workers, for instance, have a
great deal to do with the health of their clients, but are
not subject to their orders as nurses are, so their work is
not classified as medical, even when it takes places in a
hospital setting (17).
New regions are constantly being annexed to the medical
domain: substance abuse, child and wife abuse, and
rehabilitation all could be dealt with by nonmedical means,
and often are. However, where cooperation between
professions is needed, it only runs in one direction: -from
the outside into the medical domain. Teachers, ministers,
and social workers refer clients to physicians, but rarely
receive referrals from physicians, who are not accustomed to
admitting that there are problems that are soluble, but not
by their own methods (18). As a result, resources meant for
many social, economic, and religious problems flow through
the medical system (19).
There have been attempts made in many nations to
control physicians in order to limit health-care spending.
Comparative international studies show that lay authorities
have had little influence over the profession so far (20).
In the United States alone, at least five instruments have
been tried or recommended, through which it was hoped that
individual practitioners could be influenced to decrease
medical spending: the distribution of physicians by
specialty, government red tape, other physicians, the
patient, and the practitioners' own financial interest.
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re they ordered treatment was found to
lead to less and later treatment (21). The U.S. government
has been trying for years to use physicians to police one
another: a current effort has made Professional Review
Organizations (PROs), composed of physicians, sign contracts
with the federal government to reduce hospital deaths and
admissions by certain percentages in designated areas (22).
Economists often recommend using the patient to limit
medical spending by shifting more of the dollar cost of
treatment to its subject. Unfortunately, it appears that
patients can control whether they go to seek medical help,
but not how much of it they will then receive.
Private physicians' financial interest is the target of
current proposals to limit their fees for visits to hospital
patients according to a version of the DRG schedule; a
similar system would set their fees for office visits at
levels determined by a classification of ambulatory visit
groups (AVGs). This would mean that performing or ordering
An early effort sought
extra procedures would earn no extra income for the
practitioner (23).
There probably is no way to control the independent
practitioner; that is why the American Medical Association
has been defending the independence of the solo, office-
based practitioner so tenaciously. It will be necessary to
try the other tactic of placing the physician inside an
organization and then putting pressure on the organization
to find its own way to control him. Deborah Stone has
suggested that it may be useful to consider arrangements
that organizations other than third-party payers have
already used to control doctors.
Stone distinguishes between doctors in clinical
practice, whose primary duty is to the patient, and doctors
in a certifying role, whose duty is to determine whether
patients should be classified as sick or well for the
purposes of an organization. Independent practitioners can
act as certifiers, as when they give patients physical
examinations for employment; the more relevant situation
here is that of the doctor employed by an organization to
determine whether his employer or another organization
should treat a patient as a sick or well person (24).
Certifying doctors differ from those in clinical
practice in that they are more likely to distrust their
patients' reports. Thomas Scheff has found evidence that
clinical doctors, when faced with uncertainty, use the
decision rule that it is better to call a well person sick
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than to call a sick person well (25). Certifying doctors are
under pressure to follow the opposite rule, that patients
are well until proven sick, if their organization wishes to
conserve benefits that accompany the sick role.
The outcome of the conflict between the professional
inclination to be lenient with patients and the bureauratic
preference for stringency often depends on the physician's
relationship to the bureaucracy and the particular
bureaucracy's commitment to stringency. In 1970, for
example, the Social Security Administration allowed 60% of
claims by final determination, while the Railroad Retirement
system allowed 91X of claims in 1969 (26). If the
organization is committed to restricting benefits it grants
to sick people, there are three ways commonly used to
influence its physicians.
Direct incentives are the simplest, but clearly
conflict with professional ideals. Therefore they are not
always openly advertised: an example of this is that of the
company doctor who receives a bonus for keeping compensation
rates down (27). Now that the public image of doctors
attributes more greed to them than before, and greed has
become fairly respectable, this incentive can be openly used
on clinical physicians in the interests of cost containment
by insurers and providers.
A second way bureaucracies control certifying doctors
is by formal written standards. This was widely used by
benefit-granting government programs, as when they spell out
the levels of disability that qualify victims to different
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levels of compensation (28). When medical criteria lists are
used to grant nonmedical benefits, doctors seem to mind this
standardization much less than when they are used to limit
medical benefits, as by the PSROs. Stone suggests that this
is because the physicians do not feel responsible for the
nonmedical fate of their patients, as has been suggested
above in the discussion of their preference for preventive
medicine over preventive welfare (29). Written standards,
popular with doctors or not, are becoming much more
feasible now that PSROs and PROs have years of their own
records to form into standards and computers have made the
work of doing so manageable. They play a large part in
current plans to limit medical spending by rate-setting.
A third way bureaucracies control certifying doctors is
by having other doctors check up on them in some kind of
administrative review. In this situation they are not being
judged against written standards, but by the expert
knowledge of a peer. This is most effective when the
certifying doctor and the reviewer are both employed by the
same organization and the first doctor feels free to be
strict because the patient can appeal his judgment to a more
lenient reviewer. The bureacracy can easily screen appeals
to at least reduce their number, thus saving resources, and
the strict physician does not have to feel responsible for
the fate of the patient (30). It is possible that cost-
containers might decide to adopt this method, if, for
instance, they put more pressure on housestaff than private
physicians to adhere to written standards; the housestaff
knows that dissatisfied patients are always free to appeal
to their own physicians. Providers would, however, be
foolish to publicize any bias they could instill in their
employees by this method.
All three methods--direct incentives, written standards,
and the right of appeal--can be most effectively adapted to
the needs of providers if they can put health-care
purchasing decisions in the hands of a doctor whose role is
limited to that of certifier. To the extent that a
physician can specialize in diagnosis rather than therapy,
he can feel that his employer is not interfering with his
meaningful professional power, which is the prescription and
performance of treatment.
The most common and costly health care provider
organization is the hospital, which is different from most
organizations. Before we see how the certifying role might
fit into a hospital, it is necessary to determine how
hospitals were organized before they faced cost-containment
pressure.
Jeffrey Harris has described the hospital as two
business firms in one. In this model, there is a supply side
run by administrators and a demand side run by doctors (31).
The supply side is made up of what are 'called "ancillary
departments": radiology, pharmacy, operating rooms, cardiac
catheterization lab, intensive care unit, and blood bank are
usually ancillary departments. The demand for these
departments' products is determined by physicians who are
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organized into "clinical services" by medical specialties,
whose members are often arranged in no particular
hierarchy.
The demand expressed by the physicians of the clinical
services is itself determined by the needs of their
patients; the physician is the intermediary between
hospital administrators and patients. An intermediary is
needed, officially, because matching patients' symptoms with
appropriate quantities of hospital services and supplies
requires the expert knowledge of the medical profession.
Actually, the physician is also needed because there is a
basic conflict between the interests of patients and
hospital administrators.
Like any business firm, the hospital has a capacity
that is fixed in the short run. The higher the rate of
utilization of things for which the hospital must pay a
fixed price, like existing beds, salaried workers, and CAT
scanners, the more revenue the hospital can earn on those
fixed costs. Hospital administrators prefer to operate at a
level as close as possible to full capacity. The needs of
patients, however, are unpredictable over time. For any
fixed amount of capacity, there are bound to be some
patients who could derive some benefit from a larger
capacity, since there will inevitably be a time when there
will not be enough operating rooms, for instance, to hold
all the patients who want to have surgery before their
doctors go on summer vacation. For patients, it is thus
= -
better to have excess capacity that sits idle until they
need it (32).
In Harris' model, the physician is sti"ll acting in the
interests of the patient. For the sake of the patient,
within any given capacity, physicians have reason to compete
with each other and haggle with officials in charge of the
ancillary services for things that are in short supply.
Harris suggests two ways risk of shortages is avoided. One
way is to put the risk of a shortage outside the hospital
entirely by limiting admissions so that there are never
crises of excess demand. In institutions that do this,
doctors feel secure enough to share pooled resources, which
can then be allocated as "efficiently" as possible.
If admissions are not limited, physicians will directly
face the risk of shortages. They then will learn to hoard
scarce resources, often by marking certain supplies as the
property of their own clinical service. This will produce
pockets of excess capacity in each clinical service, which
is less efficient than pooled reserves (33). The
administration's power in this situation will be expressed
by making rules which it will enforce to a degree that
varies with the tightness of supply.
Harris claims that this model makes it clear that there
is no point in putting pressure on hospitals to keep costs
down if the pressure is not directed to the doctors' side of
the organization (34). We have seen, however, from Stone's
analysis that there are ways to transfer physicians'
allegiance from patients to bureaucratic goals. One hope of
third-party payers of medical costs is that putting pressure
on hospitals to contain costs will force them to learn how
to make this transfer.
The transfer cannot be clumsily forced upon physicians
by hospitals, for instance, refusing admitting privileges to
wasteful doctors. Hospitals are dependent upon physicians to
supply them with customers; traditionally their only other
source has been the emergency room, which draws a
disproportionately high percentage of uninsured
patients (35). They are now trying to become less dependent
on physicians by "marketing" their services and clinics
directly to patients and entering into arrangements with
HMOs who provide another source of admissions.
At this time, though, hospitals must still use less
obvious methods of control on physicians; an effective one
is to make clinicians feel more like the certifying doctors
Stone studied. The distinction matters because certifiers
have no ongoing relationship with patients and do not bear
responsiblity for their health and treatment.
Private physicians have eroded their own relationships
with patients to the extent that they have let hospital
employees take over their tasks. They no longer accept full
responsibility for the patient once they become unavailable
on nights, weekends and vacations. They may give orders to
the hospital staff, but the staff is also under
administrators' orders, which will be followed at least some
of the time. The intrusion of other hospital employees into
the doctor-patient relationship means that the doctor has
other relationships which require their own loyalty,
especially since they are more a part of his ongoing daily
life than is any particular patient (36).
Physicians are more willing to take orders from other
physicians than from hospital administrators, who are
therefore wise to concentrate their efforts on individual
physicians who can be groomed to head clinical services. It
has been common for quite a while to appoint physicians as
chiefs of radiology, pathology, and lab services; these
specialists have no private patients and thus no patients'
interests to conflict with those of the hospital.
There are even overlapping interests of bureaucracy and
professionalism; they both seek authority over the patient.
The mystique of the professional is heightened by health
workers under him who withhold information from patients.
It does not matter whether this is a result of bureaucratic
buck-passing or professional dominance; the alliance of
professional and bureaucrat strengthen them both with
respect to the patient (37).
Of Stone's three ways of controlling doctors, the one
most conspicuously being used in hospitals now is that of
written standards, as in rate-setting schemes and
utilization review by peers. Salaried physicians are, of
course, subject to financial incentives from hospitals.
These incentives become much stronger in prepaid plans, in
which a given pool of physicians and other health workers is
responsible for all care at a annual fixed fee per patient.
Table 3-1 shows one of the major effects of the
financial incentive or, perhaps, the lack of it in prepaid
plans. British general practitioners receive a yearly fee
for each of their regular patients, and often cannot charge
extra fees for extra services performed. Almost one-fourth
of them think the majority of their patients come to them
with trivial complaints; this is in sharp contrast with most
U.S. primary care physicians. The only category of U.S.
primary care physicians in which a larger fraction of
memmbers thinks the majority of their patients present
trivial complaints is that of the physicians in prepaid
practice.
This pattern may be partly due to the fact that patients
in prepaid plans have no economic deterrent
screen their own complaints. However, prepai
bureaucratic deterrents to impose nonmone
clients, such as long waits for app
inconvenient hours or locations (38). Studie
prepaid practice have shown that they work
time pressure than fee-for-service doctors
time to each patient (39). They are less li
to make them
d plans can use
tary costs on
ointments, or
s of doctors in
under greater
and give less
kely to agree
that doctors should work long hours and sacrifice themselves
for patients than are fee-for-service practitioners; they
are less tolerant of patients with obesity, alcoholism, and
other psychosocial problems (40).
Holding the actual health status of practices
constant, physicians in prepaid practice are more likely to
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TABLE 3-1 Reports concerning trivial
consultations in varying practice settings
Reporting
50% or More
Patients
Are Trivial
Reporting
10% or Less
Patients
Are Trivial
British general practitioners (N - 772) 24 12
All nongroup U.S. primary care physicians (N - 1148)' 7 36
All group U.S. primary care physicians (N - 310)* 10 36
Nongroup U.S. general practitioners (N - 604) 9 33
Group U.S. general practitioners (N - 113) 13 27
Nongroup U.S. pediatricians (N - 136) 9 31
Group U.S. pediatricians (N - 43) 9 33
Prepaid U.S. general practitioners (N - 108)b 32 7
Prepaid U.S. pediatricians (N - 154)b 29 14
Includes general practitioners, pediatricians, internists, and obstetricians.
I Includes physicians in practices involving 50 per cent or more prepaid practice
activity.
Source:
David Mechanic, The Growth of Bureaucratic
Medicine, New York:
1976, p. 106.
John Wiley and Sons,
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complain that their patients' complaints are trivial if they
have too little time to see patients. Under these
conditions, it is not surprising that doctors have little
patience with the large part of medical practice that is
composed of emotional and social problems since they are
trained more for technical solutions to strictly medical
problem. Unlike fee-for-service physiciansthose in prepaid
plans cannot even rid themselves of exasperating patients
by encouraging them to seek help elsewhere; "elsewhere"
would be a coworker in the same plan who would not
appreciate the referral (41).
Patients who chose to see private physicians, when
asked why they had not chosen to switch to a prepaid plan
they were offered, expressed a high value for their
established relationship with their family doctor and a fear
of impersonal care (42). Patients enrolled in prepaid
practice, compared to private patients, showed less
satisfaction with their doctor's concern for their health,
his warmth, his interest, and the amount of information he
gave them (43).
It is important to remember that just because
physicians limit the expenditure of their own effort on
patients, does not mean that they limit their use of other
resources. In fact, overloaded doctors in prepaid practice
have been found to save their own time by sending patients
for diagnostic tests or cutting short an appointment, to be
continued at a later visit (44). Although the differences
between private and prepaid practitioners may be small in
CD
percentage points, they indicate that prepaid practices
succeed in changing the way physicians define the
legitimacy of patients' demands.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONSUMER HEALTH MOVEMENT
The "consumer" referred to in the consumer health
movevement is the patient, not the insurance company or the
employer who pays for treatment. There is another term,
"patients' rights movement," which is often used
interchangeably with "consumer health movement". To me the
two have slightly different connotations. I associate
"patients' rights" with issues sick people confront when
they deal with mainstream medical providers, such as the
right to refuse care or to see their own medical records.
The right of access to care without regard to ability to pay
for it, to the extent that it is acknowledged, falls into
this category.
The term "consumer" implies the power to choose, which
in regard to health can include choosing to treat a problem
in an alternative option to the mainstream medical system,
or to take it out of the medical realm altogether. It also
conveys a sense of the marketplace, in which dollars are
needed to transform need into effective demand; for that
reason I associate it more with the desire to overcome
nonfinancial than financial barriers to the freedom to make
health care decisions.
Many of the demands of the consumer health movement
could lower costs, since they involve the use of more
"caring" and less technologically intensive "curing"
medical techniques. However, lowering costs is not a major
goal of the consumer health movement, although it is
becoming important to some consumer groups. Advocates for
the elderly, such as the American Association for Retired
People, recognize that as Medicare's costs rise, it becomes
less popular with taxpayers and their elected officials.
Consumer health activists' overall goal is to capture
or reassign some of the power of providers. They favor three
major shifts: from bureaucrats, like hospital administrators
or government officials, to laypeople; from physicians to
other caregivers; and from physicians and other caregivers
to patients. A fourth shift of power, from physicians to
bureaucrats, is already taking place as described in Chapter
3, but it is not anything consumers wanted.
SHIFTING POWER FROM BUREAUCRATS TO LAYPEOPLE
This often takes the form of decentralization. In some
contexts, decentralization just moves power down the
bureaucratic chain of command; in the consumer health
movement, it puts power outside the bureaucracy
entirely (1) . During the 1960s, decentralization meant
opening small neighborhood health centers to replace
centralized hospitals, especially for primary care. Current
decentralization takes two forms. One is the shift from
public to private, often for-profit, ownership and
management of facilities. The other is the transfer of
functions from large institutions to community-based
programs, which are located either in freestanding local
facilities or in the patient's home (2). Health activists
do not usually urge the privatization of public care,
although they may welcome private innovations that broaden
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the options available to' those who can afford them.
Activists have, however, founded many trailblazing
community-based facilities, such as hospices and birthing
centers (3).
Decentralization directly threatens the power of
hospital administrators. Indirectly it threatens that of
health professionals, since many community-based facilities
are staffed by laypeople, often on a volunteer basis, or by
paid nonphysicians.
THE SHIFT OF POWER FROM PHYSICIAN TO PATIENT
The American Hospital Association (AHA) adopted a
Patients' Bill of Rights in 1973, to be voluntarily endorsed
by its members (4). It is a tame document: for example,
patients are protected from procedures performed upon them
without their "informed consent," but verbal consent or
written consent obtained without the patient's comprehension
of the risk involved are both acceptable. Consent is not
required at all in emergency situations or in cases where a
doctor fears that giving the patient the information needed
to grant consent could cause damage or irrational
decisionmaking (5).
The notion of informed consent implies the right to
refuse care, which has become quite common in hospitals.
Most refusals were of drugs, tests and minor therapeutic
measures, but some are life-threatening (6). The right to
refuse life-preserving treatment is not clearly defined.
When the issue has been brought to court, judges have tended
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to order treatment if it will cure the patient, but not if
it will simply prolong dying and do so against the patient's
wishes (7).
Patients may use refusal of consent as a way to get
more information (8). In an analysis of five consent forms
from major Los Angeles hospitals, four were found to be as
hard to read as a scientific journal; the fifth was at the
level of a specialized academic magazine. Another study
found that when 200 patients were asked about consent forms
they had signed the day before for chemotherapy, radiation
treatment, or surgery, only 60. knew what they had
signed (9).
In demanding such patients' rights as that to refuse
care or to see their records, patients are still depending
on the physician to supply whatever care will be given. In
two other modes of care, laypeople do the healing: these are
self-help and self-care.
Self-care is what it sounds like: the patient tries to
prevent, diagnose or treat his own illness. This includes
activities physicians approve of, such as complying with
their orders, as well as ones they consider dangerous, such
as taking medicine prescribed for a previous illness.
To some extent, most people do some self-care;
attempting to expand its scope is difficult, because while
any consumer is free to decide to practice self-care, the
very act of teaching or urging others to practice self-care
may undermine the independence needed to do so. Linda
Alexander identifies this as the double bind faced by
~n LI
patients who are being trained to do kidney dialysis on
themselves at home: they must learn a complex procedure in
which a small mistake could kill them. This threat
undermines their confidence just when they are under most
pressure from their instructors--medical professionals--to
act like responsible, independent people (10).
A recent survey of formal self-care programs found that
three kinds of activities are most common: ones to prevent
illness or increase "wellness"; "patient education," in
which people learn special skills needed to cope with
illness they already have; and "activated patient
programs," in which patients learn social skills needed to
negotiate with providers (11). These are all interventions
which physicians consider harmless at worst, since they do
not conflict with the use of professional treatment during
illness. It is therefore not surprising that 55"4 of such
programs are sponsored by health care providers, and that
most use health professionals as instructors.
Self-help is actually misnamed, since it refers to
group efforts by laypeople to give mutual aid (12). A
British study of the subject found that self-help groups
grew rapidly in the 1970s, at a time when organized social
services were also expanding. This growth was probably due
to the patients' rights movement, since the people in self-
help groups tend to be atypical in a way resembling
patients' rights activists: they have an unusually strong
interest in whatever is the focus of the group, and a
genuine desire to help others. Key members of self-help
groups draw on their own past experience to help new
members, in what is called "serial reciprocity."
The purpose of self-help groups is to provide support
of a kind that professionals cannot give, since it is their
members' shared experience of problems which provides help.
There are two kinds of problems for which self-help groups
can supplement or replace medical services: the need for
information and support in passing through a normal
development phase, such as childbirth or retirement; and the
need for help in adjusting to an injury, illness or
therapeutic procedure. The very distance which health
professionals maintain to preserve their objectivity and
authority prevents them from giving patients reassurance
that there is a way of treating what has happened to them as
"normal." It is particularly hard for patients to adjust to
new, chronic conditions if they have no examples to follow
of how others get through everyday life with their
condition. Once they have learned how to live with their
condition, the chance to help others do so gives them
something positive to associate with having the
condition (13).
SHIFTING POWER FROM PHYSICIANS TO OTHER PROVIDERS
Almost any provider of care earns less than a physician
for treating the same problem. This is one -reason why
physicians find it so difficult to eliminate their
competition. Another reason is that physicans cannot always
cure the problems of patients who can afford their
services, who then may turn elsewhere for help.
Alternative providers of care include other
professionals trained in mainstream medicine, such as
nurses; professionals trained in other medical traditions,
such as folk healers, chiropractors and holistic healers;
and professionals trained in nonmedical traditions, such as
social workers and priests.
An analysis of the social functions of chiropractors
from the New England Journal of Medicine is applicable to
other alternative caregivers as well. They:
-provide a place to which troublesome patients can go when
they leave the physician.
-legitimize the "sick status" of patients for whom doctors
can do no more: to be legitimately sick, patients must
be trying to get well.
-justify physicians' professional status and privilege
by occasionally providing examples of incompetence which
can be blamed on their lack of proper training.
-cure some patients, especially in areas in which they are
more expert than doctors, as curanderos are in the
emotional problems of Chicanos.
-provide more emotional support than physicians, use
community support systems more, and fit in better with
their clients' values.
-provide an alternate channel of innovation, as
chiropractors did in the treatment of musculoskeletal
problems by physical therapy (14).
MAKING INFORMATION ACCESSIBLE TO PATIENTS
Access to information about quality of care can shift
power from either bureaucrats or physicians to patients. The
present environment offers a new combination of low-cost,
sophisticated data-processing technology with a decade of
information-gathering about providers by regulatory bodies.
Third-party payers are beginning to gather and distribute
comparative information about provider prices to patients;
some of them are including quality-of-care data in this
effort (15).
Advocates of competition as a way of maintaining quality
of care in the medical marketplace assume a universe of
competent providers and patients with varying tastes. In
this universe, freedom of choice allows dissatisfied
patients to reject a doctor, not for incompetence, but for
unsuitablity to individual preferences. Supposedly it all
gets sorted out so that patients wind up with satisfactory
providers, each to his or her own taste.
Consumer health activists see the medical marketplace
in a less rosy light. If some providers are not competent,
freedom of choice allows patients to leave them, but does
not prevent new patients from trying them, because there is
no warning of their incompetence. There is little incentive
for patients to undertake the effort necessary to warn
others about incompetent providers. In England, where
patients do not have freedom to choose their health care
providers, a mechanism has been set up to process consumer
complaints (16), In the U.S., where patients are free to
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abandon a physician, there have been no formal alternatives
less drastic than malpractice suits to influence physicians'
future behavior.
This seems to be changing. A 1975 study of the possible
uses of PSRO data noted that "statistical analysis now makes
it possible to develop meaningful judgements about the
overall performance of individual physicians and hospitals"
(17). A recent federal regulation has made PRO data
available to patients (18). Some consumer groups are
starting to assemble their own databases on providers. In
1981, an information center in California began providing
not only traditional self-care information about how to
diagnose and treat illnesses, but also information on
specific providers supplied to it by patients (19). The
founder of this center intended it to "spotlight the bad
apples" so medical consumers would know how to avoid them;
understandably, physicians objected strongly to there being
a database containing subjective appraisals by laypeople of
the quality of their work.
Providers had a less hostile reaction to the "People's
Medical Society," a group attempting to provide objective
data on providers to its consumer members. Its goal is to
assemble a database covering all U.S. hospitals, plus as
many nursing homes and phsyicians as possible. The
information it gathers on hospitals, for example, includes
number of malpractice suits against the staff and the
hospital, mortality rates for specific procedures, findings
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of PSROs, hysterectomy rates, and physician/nurse staffing
patterns (20) .
INFLUENCES OF THE CONSUMER HEALTH MOVEMENT ON THE HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM
The innovations that the consumer health movement was
most successful in bringing to the health care system were
those that lowered providers' costs and/or appeared likely
to attract insured patients. The Patient's Bill of Rights
described above cost almost nothing to adopt and put on
prominent display, gives a hospital the appearance of being
up-to-date and responsive to consumers, and is vague enough
not to require any expensive enforcement.
Patient representative programs began in the 1960s as
liaisons between hospitals and community residents. From
1976 to 1981 the number of hospitals with such programs
rose from 1750 to 3084, but their function was not what
health activists had wanted (21). Hospitals found patients'
representatives useful to soothe discontent, not in
community residents demanding more services, but in patients
who might otherwise file malpractice suits (22).
More meaningful change has taken place in the treatment
of childbirth, a major issue of the women's health movement,
which may be the best-organized portion of the consumer
health' movement. However, these changes may conform more to
the tastes and needs of the middle class than those of the
poor.
The women's health movement had a number of goals
conserning childbirth: to win women more say in decisions
about giving birth; to allow women the option of being
assisted by midwives instead of or in addition to doctors;
to decrease the use of drugs, surgery and technological aids
like electronic fetal monitoring during pregnancy and labor;
to allow family members to be present during labor; and to
make the setting of birth more homelike (23).
Although 99% of infants are still born in hospitals, not
freestanding birth centers, hospitals have changed to
please women's health activists (24). There are only two
freestanding birth centers in greater Philadelphia, but 65%
of the region's hospitals have birthing rooms, and all of
them now allow family members to be present during birth
(25). The use of midwives is still rare, but from 1980 to
1981 it increased by 8% for in-hospital birth and 15% for
out-of-hospital birth. It can be expected to increase more
now that more insurance companies cover their services.
General anaesthesia is rarely used today, and local
anaesthesia has been partly replaced by milder painkillers.
Unfortunately, without painkillers, mothers need coaching
in relaxation and breathing techniques and the support of a
friend or relative to deal with childbirth. Many low-income
women cannot afford or do not know about childbirth
education; single women may feel ill-at-ease in Lamaze
classes without a partner (25).
Studies of childbirth taking place outside the hospital
show that its medical outcome seems to be equal to in-
hospital birth for low-risk women (26). Most women who
choose this option are middle-class, white, and older than
the average mother (27). This is partly because low-income
women, those under 18, and those who have not had prenatal
care are screened out as high-risk cases, but women over 35
having their first child are also high-risk patients and yet
are well-represented among mothers giving birth outside the
hospital.
This may be an area where, if care is taken to adapt an
alternative method of treatment to their needs, low-income
people can benefit from it. This is suggested by the
results of three studies: one of home births attended by
midwives in North Carolina, and two of alternatiive birth
centers--one in the south Bronx and the other in rural
Texas. In all three, demographically high-risk women were
screened to eliminate those at high medical risk; the
remaining women had medical outcomes as good or better than
the national averages for in-hospital delivery (28). The
reports do not discuss what the women in these studies
thought of alternative childbirth. In all three cases, it
may have been chosen because it was the least expensive
option; the average birth center charges about half of a
hospital's fee for delivery (29).
Two other alternative types of care that resemble
alternative childbirth are home care and hospice care. They
too substitute nurses or other cheaper labor for doctors,
involve friends and family in care, and take place in the
home or a homelike setting. Consumer health activists favor
them because they make care more personal and less
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intimidating, while insurance companies interested in their
potential to save money (30). These options can be expected
to become more available as insurance coverage for them
expands; if the consumer health movement wants to protect
poor patients as well as richer ones, it will have to see
that alternative care is not forced upon people who want or
need more technological, professional care, or whose homes
and social networks are less comforting than a hospital and
its staff.
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to the
question of how representative the consumer health movement
is of patients, and how representative patients are of all
U.S. citizens, and whether the goals of the consumer health
movement reflect social values. While the consumer health
movement is ultimately an offshoot of the civil rights
movement, many of its members, tactics, and ideological
tenets come directly from feminism and consumerism. Both of
these are supported by movements which have been criticized
for their white, middle-class membership, which is assumed
to orient them towards white, middle-class needs.
HOW REPRESENTATIVE THE CONSUMER HEALTH MOVEMENT IS OF
PATIENTS
The federal government commissioned a pair of parallel
surveys published in 1982, in which national samples of
health care providers and consumers were asked complementary
questions about how and by whom health care decisions are
and should be made.
The report shows that 51% of consumers have gone to
another doctor for a second opinion on at least one
occasion (32). Of those who underwent surgery, 52% based
their decision on their own opinion or on a combination of
their own and their doctors'opinions. Thirty-six percent of
all patients have changed doctors at some time due to a
disagreement, and 21% have refused a recommended treatment.
A 1978 study of lung cancer patients showed that physicians
and patients can have very different preferences for
treatment based on the same information: cancer patients
prefer less risky therapies with higher short-term
probability of survival, while physicians prefer more risky
therapies with higher long-term probability of
survival (33).
The majority of doctors polled nationwide say that at
least once a day they have to make a decision about whether
a patient should be told the whole truth about his condition
or treatment. For most of them, the primary reason for
withholding information is that the patient would not be
able to understand it. On the average, doctors think nearly
one-fourth of their patients would be unable to understand
the truth (34). The public, however, thinks that if a
patient doesn't understand his treatment, it is always or
often because the doctor didn't explain it well (35).
The responsibility of the physician to obtain informed
consent before treatment and the right of the patient to
refuse treatment become meaningless once physicians withhold
information from patients. If most patients want to take on
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all or part of the responsibility of making their own health
care decisions, for which they need full information from
physicians, then they are in agreement with the consumer
health movement and its activists are in that sense
representative of most patients.
Table 4-1 shows that most patients believe that
increasing their role in decisionmaking would improve the
quality of their care (36). Table 4-2 shows that most
physicians hold the incompatible view that if patients
disagree with them, physicians have a duty to see that those
patients are persuaded to change their minds (37). These
findings imply that patients' rights advocates are
representing the majority of patients in demanding a bigger
role in decisionmaking, and in trying to gain some power
over physicians in order to do so.
HOW WELL CONSUMER ACTIVISTS REPRESENT ALL INDIVIDUAL
CITIZENS
However, there are differences in opinions held by
patients of different demographic groups, and in opinions
held by doctors whose patients are from different
demographic groups. A major finding of the Harris poll was
that:
"The older, poorest/low income, and least
educated segments of the public are generally the
most satisfied with present disclosure practices and
least interested in participating in medical
decisionmaking. These population segments are also
the most likely to be ill. Further analysis of the
data reveals that the greater satisfaction... is
related to their socially dependent status, not
their greater experience with medical
situation" (38).
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TABLE 4-1
EFFECT OF INCREASED PATIENT ROLE IN DECISIONHAKING: GENERAL PUBLIC
Q.: Do you believe that increasing the patient's role in medical decisionmaking is likely to improve the quality of
medical care, reduce the quality of medical' care, or have no effect on it?
GENERAL PUBLIC
EDUCATION
IMPROVE THE
QUALITY
REDUCE THE
QUALITY
HAVE NO
EFFECT
NOT SURE 7
64 63 65 62 59
22 23 21 23 19
6 8 8 9
LESS
THAN
,HIGH
SCHOOL
GRADUATE
242
HIGH
SCHOOL
GRADUATE
726
COLLEGE
GRADUATE
280
z % z
52 66 67
8 8 6
- 23 21 23
15 6 4
$7,500
OR LESS
164
z
$7,501
TO
$15,000
219
z
INCOME
$15,001
TO
$25 000
341
z
5Z),UU1
TO
$35,000
229
x
MORE
THAN
$35,000
214
z
56 61 66 68 66
10 6 7 10 5
21 24 21 19 26
12 9 6 3 2
TABLE 4-2
PHYSICIAN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PERSUADE PATIENT: PHYSICIANS
Q.: When a patient disagrees with your recommendation for a particular procedure or
course of treatment that you think is strongly medically indicated, do you feel that
it is your responsibility to try to persuade the patient to accept the medically
indicated course of action, or do you feel that you have no responsibility to do this?
PHYSICIANS
BASE
TOTAL
70
RESPONSIBILITY
TO PERSUADE
NO RESPONSIBILITY
EPENDS (VOL.)
OBTAINED
MEDICAL DEGREE
1966 1967 1973
AND TO AND
BEFORE 1972 LATER
1 T 266
z % %
PATIENTS WITH
SERIOUS ILLNESS
0% 26% MORE
TO TO THAN
25% 50% 50%
T7 229 193
%. %. %
75 75 62 79 74 76 76
6 6 6 5 5 6 7
18 18 31 15 20 17 15
POOR
PATIENTS
25% 26% 51%
OR TO OR
LESS 50% MORE
50 T3 TT
75 73 82
5 6 8
19 20 9
Source: The President's Commission for the Informed
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, Making Health Care Decisions:
The Ethical and Legal Imlications of Informed Consent
in the Patient Practitioner Relationship, October, 1982,
pp. 200,211 78
BASE
TOTAL
1251
z
REPORTED
EXCELLENT
482
z
HEALTH STATUS
GOOD FAIR POOR
3 144 73
2 z z
8 9 6 6 11
It is possible that this satisfaction is due to lower
standards; poor people make relatively few consumer
complaints about anything (39). The elderly and the poor are
overrepresented in the category of the less educated.
Doctors whose patients are primarily poor people may have
lower standards than those who treat richer people.
Table 4-3 shows that doctors work longer hours in a
week if they work in hospitals, are recent graduates, treat
sicker patients, or treat mostly poor patients. It also
shows that doctors who work longer hours are less likely to
think their patients understand what they tell them (40).
We already saw that doctors who think their patients will
not understand them are more likely to withhold information
from them. Table 4-3 suggests that the doctors mostly like
to treat poor people--overworked residents and interns in
hospital outpatient departments--will withhold information
from them, thinking it would take too long to explain things
to them.
A possible explanation for why people with less than a
high school diploma are relatively unlikely to feel their
contribution would improve the decisions made about their
care is that they might be right--it is possible that they
would have to span too wide an information gap because of
their lack of basic knowledge that high school graduates
take for granted. It is also possible that the lack of a
high school diploma is related to low self-esteem in
general.
~7
Table 4-3 Hours worked by physicians in various categories
Let me benin by askina you a few general questions about your
practice, Including both inpatient and outpatient care, approximately
how many hours do you spend on direct patient care activities in an average week?
PATIENTS WITH
OBTAINED MEDICAL DEBREE SERIOUS ILLNESS
PRACTICE LOCATION 1966 1967 1973 MORE
------------------ AND TO AND 01 261 THAN
TOTAL OFFICE HOSPITAL BEFORE 1972 AFTER TO 25% TO 50% 50%
BASE 805 533 232 441 97 266 367 229 193
MEAN NO:
OF HOURS 53,2 4917 61,8 48.1 52.,6 62,2 50,7 53,7 58
STANDARD
ERROR 0,6 0l6 1.5 0,6 1.6 1 0.8 12 1.5
PATIENTS
UNDERSTANDING TREATMENT POOR PATIENTS
OL 70% 90% 25% OR 26% TO 51% OR
TOTAL TO 69 TO B9 TO 100% LESS 50% MORE
BASE 805 150 270 384 500 143 107
MEAN NO,
OF HOURS 5312 56,3 53,5 51,8 51,6 52.9 62:3
STANDARD
ERROR 0,6 1.7 1t1 08 0.7 1,6 23
Source: The President's Commission for the Study of Informed Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Makino Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of
Informed Consent, October 1982, page 82,
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One certainty is that all the variables are
interrelated--income, education, age, and health status--and
that the majority position in favor of patients' rights does
not reflect the views of the minority most in need of
medical care. Other studies show a strong relationship
between having information and recognizing a need for care
(41). This is unfortunate, because it means that those who
need care the most are least likely to seek it.
This may explain why the easier access to care that
Medicaid made possible for the poor never brought them up to
quite the same level of use as richer individuals with the
same level of illness (42). A 1954 study showed that lower-
class Americans were indifferent to most of 17 symptoms
requiring attention, while upper-class people reacted to
most of them at least 75"4 of the time (43). A study of
Danish patients, who face no financial barriers to care,
also found that people with less education and low income
were more likely than others to carry on with their usual
routines when they were ill. This was especially true for
housewives, the self-employed, and unskilled workers, all of
whom "pay" for admitting illness and obtaining care to the
extent that they lose time from work, since no one
compensates or replaces them during "sick" time (44).
One way of looking the this assumes that there is a
"culture of poverty" characterized by short-term thinking,
resignation, and a stoic acceptance of suffering. Since
"culture of poverty" thinking has proved useless in most
other contexts, it may be more useful to take the structural
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view proposed by Catherine Riessman, which assumes that poor
people would seek health care more often if they were not
discouraged from doing so by aspects of the health care
system (45).
Riessman notes that in the hospital outpatient clinics,
emergency rooms, and public clinics where the poor get most
of their care, there are long waits to see impersonal
doctors who offer fragmented care. A 1972 study found that
after the introduction of Medicaid, the proportion of poor
patients using private physicians as their source of primary
care rose from 1% to only 10%, a fact patients attributed to
their belief that doctors in hospitals and public clinics
were better than those in private practice (46). It is
possible that the private physicians who accepted Medicaid
at that time were inferior, especially those willing to open
offices in locations convenient for poor people.
In 1984, however, Riessman found evidence that poor
people are capable of appreciating continuity of care. One
study randomly assigned some welfare families to
comprehensive care and compared them to others receiving
their usual fragmented clinic care. The families receiving
comprehensive care showed much higher use of services,
particularly preventive ones, such as postpartum and well-
baby care (47). Similar results appeared studies of low-
income people using 21 neighborhood health centers: these
received more immunization and dental care, and used
hospital emergency rooms less. At one center, the polio
vaccination rate of children went from 78% to 92% in
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eighteen months (48).
There is other evidence that patients who prefer to
play a passive role in their health care might change their
preference if the consumer health movement made more
information available to them. In a study of 210
hypertensive patients and their physicians, 78% patients
preferred their treatment decisions to be made by their
doctors. However, 55% wanted "quite a lot" or "very
extensive" information about their conditions; physicians
underestimated this percentage, at 38%. As in the nationwide
poll, the patients who wanted to participate more in
decisionmaking were disproportionately young, white, higher
income, and well educated. A new finding in this study,
which followed patients through time, was that the amount of
participation patients wanted increased with duration of
treatment and experience with hypertensive drugs. Many of
those who wanted their doctors to make treatment decisions
at the time they began treatment hoped to be more active
later, when they would have experience with their
medications (49). This finding is particularly interesting
because an earlier study found that hypertensive patients
who took an active role in their treatment showed mean
diastolic pressure that was significantly lower than that of
more passive patients (50).
HOW WELL PATIENTS REPRESENT SICK PEOPLE
Another question that must be considered is how well
patients represent sick people. As described above, low-
income and less educated people are disproportionately
unlikely to seek care when they are ill (51). Therefore, to
the extent it is responsive to patients and those who
advocate their rights, the current health care system is
tailored to the needs of educated middle and upper-income
people, who are not the sickest people (52).
HOW WELL THE CONSUMER HEALTH MOVEMENT REFLECTS SOCIAL VALUES
Health care is not just an individual purchase; it is
bought by the whole nation in the form of insurance and the
other expenses passed through the system of payments
described in Figure 2-1. A nation's decision as to whether
health care is worth paying for is heavily influenced by the
distribution of the real and the perceived risks of illness
in that nation.
Lester Thurow has said that our system of health
insurance is breaking down now because insurance is only
meant for events which occur to a small fraction of
subscribers to a plan. Now that most of us will live to be
old, the majority of subscribers to any insurance plan will
have high medical expenses at some time in their lives (52).
For all the talk of home birth, pregnancy is still the most
common reason for hospital admission, and everyone needs to
be born. Similarly, we all hope to grow old, knowing that we
are likely to have some chronic disease if we do.
Society is more willing to pay for services that more
of its individual members expect to need. Thus, Medicare is
a very hard item to cut from the American budget. It is
politically sacred, not only because old people are
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considered needy in a respectable way, or because many
taxpayers have parents who benefit from it, who might turn
to their children for help with medical bills if the
government failed to provide it. Medicare is sacred because
taxpayers want to believe that they too will someday need
it, and by paying for it now, they express their desire to
have it remain a benefit to which all older Americans are
entitled.
It is not so easy to keep funds for maternity benefits
for unwed teenagers in the budget, since nobody hopes or
plans to be in the position of either an unwed pregnant
teenager or her child. It is easy for taxpayers to ignore
the possiblity that a person in need of those benefits might
be someone they care about enough to provide it for.
In chapter 1, I discussed the problem of cost-benefit
analysis in regard to health, which is that it is difficult
to quantify the value of a human life, especially when there
is no public discussion of whose value of the particular
life is being quantified. Our society often chooses to price
human life at the value it has to a paying employer. This is
the price most often used in legal decisions to compensate
family members for a relative's death. In the case of paying
for death, it is easy to see that the value of a life is
probably higher for family members than for an employer.
Perhaps we have refrained from incorporating this
observation into legal awards out of a delicacy which
recognizes that a monetary award cannot possibly compensate
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a family for the loss of a member.
The case of health-care cost decisions is different.
Here, money is not an inadequate substitute for a lost life,
but just the thing needed to buy continued life. It is
therefore appropriate to specify what a particular life is
worth, and to whom. This matters a great deal in a nation
where the possiblity of poor health does not vary randomly
from person to person. The fact that education is the best
predictor of good health is probably due to education being
a composite variable determined by variables like age, race
and parents' income, itself determining other variables like
present income and ability to communicate with doctors.
People tend to believe poverty and ill health are to some
degree caused by their victims. Although a few preventable
health problems, like substance abuse and violence, are more
common among the poor, no voluntary acts can be shown to
insure prosperity and health. "Blaming the victim" may be
popular because it makes people feel safer from bad luck:
if they are diligent they will be able to afford the apple a
day that keeps doctors away.
At the same time, if the public is made aware that
health care is being denied to a particular person because
of a scarcity of resources rather than the moral failure of
that person, people show sympathy for the victim. Thus
people are sympathetic to patients waiting for organ
transplants. Barney Clark, the first heart transplant
patient, was considered a hero for "risking his life in
order to save it" (53). Not only does the value of any
life differ between its appraisers; it varies over time with
variations in when a cost or a risk is incurred. Like money,
health has a time value: future health is devalued, for
instance, by a high perceived risk of nuclear war or
accidental death. Quitting smoking seems like too large a
cost for many smokers to bear when compared to the risk of
getting cancer in twenty years. Once a patient has cancer,
quitting smoking seems less costly, because the risk he
faces is no longer a distant possiblity of falling ill, but
a present certainty of living a shorter, more painful period
of time.
According to Victor Fuchs, "the amount most people are
willing to pay for a given reduction in the probability of
death is positively related to the probability of death.
Thus a person facing almost certain death would usually be
willing to pay a great deal for even a small increase in the
chance of survival; that same person, facing a low
probability of death, would not pay nearly as much for the
same increase in survival probability... If we seek a health
care system that does what people want it to do..., we
should expect considerable inequality at the margin in costs
per life saved (54).
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CHAPTER 5: CONSUMER/PATIENT ISSUES IN THE 1980S
During the 1970s, the consumer health movement worked
toward two kinds of equality: of patients to one another,
and between patients and providers. At the time, these goals
did not seem contradictory, because Medicare and Medicaid
gave their beneficiaries some purchasing power over
providers. Today patients with adequate insurance will find
providers competing for their business, and somewhat willing
to cater to their tastes. However, those with inadequate
coverage will have too much trouble getting access to any
services to be choosey about their quality.
In the 1970s, equal health advocates often represented
consumers in health planning councils, where they found
themselves on the same side as public health officials and
government regulators (1). They all challenged the
professional authority of physicians to decide the medical
needs of either communities or individual patients.
Now that the underinsured are finding it harder to get
medical treatment, their advocates will find themselves on
the same side as some physicians, against government
bureaucrats who are still challenging professional medical
authority. In addition, advocates for the underinsured will
have to side with physicians against hospital
administrators, who now may pit the survival of a whole
hospital against the claim of a physician to the resources
for one patient. This realignment can happen when physicians
continue to base decisions about use of medical resources on
traditional medical criteria., rather than the cost criteria
preferred by bureaucrats.
Activists on behalf of the insured, on the other hand,
may find their interests still coincide more with those of
bureaucrats than of physicians. Health care bureaucrats are
beginning to act more businesslike; among other things, they
now give paying patients' wishes the weight due to consumer
preferences under competition. Government officials are
working toward expanding the right of alternative providers
to compete with doctors and hospitals. Insurance companies
are covering more alternative providers and procedural
innovations, like outpatient treatment, which are favored by
consumer health activists. Hospitals are responding to
competition from alternative providers by absorbing them;
they are granting admitting privileges to chiropractors,
midwives, and other nonphysicians, and opening freestanding
clinics of their own.
Those physicians most intent on marketing themselves
resemble the businesslike bureaucrats in that they are free
from the traditional professional reluctance to advertise
and willing to allow patients to participate in decision-
making.**244 Alternative practitioners, on the other hands,
have a tendency to claim the prerogatives of professionals
to the extent that they take over their functions: they
raise their prices and the qualifications needed to join
their field (2).
In this chapter I will focus on how the interests of well-
insured and other patients have diverged in the 1980s, as
government cost containment efforts and increased
competition between providers have altered the health care
system. To do this, I will examine the relative effects of
government cost containment on different providers; how
successful containment efforts have been in keeping costs
down and in preserving access to care and quality of care;
and what role consumer health activists could play in
representing the interests of well-insured and other
patients.
There are two major forces behind the changes now
underway in the health care industry: the imposition by
third-party payers of limits on medical spending, and
increased competition among providers for paying patients.
It is important to recognize that increased competition in
the health care industry does not automatically result in
lower costs, especially in those sectors which are not yet
under rate regulation but have already benefited from the
relaxation of other regulations such as the enforcement of
antitrust laws and the lowering of licensing standards. Many
of the changes attributed by providers to cost containment
could result from competitive pressure without any
contribution from rate regulation.
GOVERNMENT COST CONTAINMENT
The third-party payer most concerned with rising
medical costs is the government, at both the local and
federal levels. The Reagan administration is reluctant to
raise taxes, eager to cut spending, and ideologically in
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favor of limiting federal activity. State, county, and
municipal governments are in many areas subject to taxpayer
which limit their revenues. While there is no
evidence that the public is against spending a
of the gross national product on health care,
want to pay higher taxes for this purpose.
growing share
it does not
Not onl
unwilling to
larger share
to 1980, the
42.7%, with
government.
slightly eac
with over
government (
government's
the disabled,
y is the government short of
spend it on health care; it
of health care costs than it used
government's share of costs rose
most of this growth borne by
revenue and
also bears a
to. From 1965
from 26.2% to
the federal
Since 1980, the government share has dropped
h year, but only to 41.9% of total spending,
two-thirds of that borne by the federal
3). It is important to remember that the
dependents include the elderly, the poor, and
all of whom require more medical care than the
average citizen (4).
The Reagan administration has called for deep cuts in
health care spending for the last five years. For 1986 it
has asked for $330.3 billion for the Department of Health
and Human Services, an increase of 3.6% from 1965, which
will just about cover inflation. Of this, $202 billion will
be for Social Security; to cover health care spending with
the remainder, a number of austerities are proposed. The
Administration wants to freeze,, at current levels, Medicare
payments to hospitals; the direct medical education subsidy
to teaching hospitals; and payments to physicians, which are
95
revolts
already under a 15-month freeze. The proposed budget also
increases copayments by beneficiaries for Medicare and home
health services (5). It has not yet been decided how the
1986 budget will look when Congress passes it, but if the
pattern of the last few years continues, the federal
government will further disclaim responsibility for its
medical dependents.
Each state receives federal reimbursement for its
Medicaid expenditures according to a formula based on the
state's per capita income, in which the maximum federal
share could legally be as high as 63"4. At this time, the
average federal share is 55%, ranging from 50-7%. In 1962,
the percent of each state's bills reimbursed by the federal
government was lowered by 3 points; in 1983, by 4 points;
and in 1984, by 4.5 points, for a total federal saving of
$455 million (6).
Late in 1982, Medicare regulation was altered to
reimburse hospitals in most states on a per-admission basis,
rather than a per-day basis. In 1983 diagnosis-related
groups (DRGs) became the basis of payment amounts; they are
a complex form of per-admission limit. The 15-month freeze
on physician fees began in July, 1984. This year a new
laboratory fee schedule will reimburse independent
laboratories and physicians for only 60. of their
costs (7).
THE END OF CROSS SUBSIDIZATION
The modern health care industry has been able to do as
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much for as many people as it has because it has benefited
from three kinds of cross subsidization. One kind is
external to providers, between payers; another is internal
to providers, between services; and the third is between
different time periods and providers, to pay for medical
research and education.
For external cross-subsidies, hospitals have
traditionally charged different prices to different payers
for the same services, depending on what they were willing
and able to pay; thus private insurers subsidized charity
care, for example. Internally, hospitals have let their
profitable products subsidize their unprofitable products.
Unlike most producers, they have nonfinancial
responsibilities which require them to provide services
which are not profitable, if they are necessary to the
community served by the hospital.
In the third kind of cross subsidization, that of
medical research and education, payers of bills from
teaching hospitals pay now for the training of physicians
whose services will be available later, in all health care
settings. Here a benefit to the whole society is subsidized
by only those payers covering bills from teaching hospitals.
When the government cut back on Medicare and Medicaid,
providers either lost clients or had to sell them care at
lower prices, which in some cases did not even cover their
costs of production. They spread these losses over other
payers, who passed them on to insurance buyers. The more
power an employer or insurer has over a provider, the fewer
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losses from government cutbacks can be passed along to them;
this has shifted an increasing burden of provider losses to
smaller, weaker payers.
It has also made all providers compete for the
shrinking supply of well-insured patients. Under
competition, providers do not necessarily have to contain
costs: they need only provide more care than average to
those who can pay for it and less to those who cannot.
Providers' costs are only -important as far as they allow
prices to patients to be kept at a low enough level to
remain competitive in a given provider's market.
THE LARGE URBAN PUBLIC TEACHING HOSPITAL
In a market in which competitors simultaneously struggle
to attract insured patients and keep uninsured ones away,
this type of provider is in a particularly bad position. The
public hospital is responsible for the care of indigent
patients. As private hospitals, both investor-owned and
nonprofit, decrease their share of charity care, while the
number of patients lacking adequate insurance increases, a
shrinking share of the patients left at public hospitals are
paying patients, to whom the costs of charity care can be
shifted (8).
Many hospitals are losing clients to freestanding
facilities and doctor's offices, because of the extension of
insurance coverage to more outpatient procedures (9).
Because these outpatient options can refuse care to
indigents, they only take paying patients from public
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hospitals, which already devote more of their resources to
outpatient services than private hospitals do, while earning
a lower fraction of their revenue from them (10).
In 1980, the poor were already concentrated in the 9% of
all hospitals which provided 40% of their care (11). The
Urban Institute has found that in 1975, community hospitals
in the 100 largest cities were earning a slight surplus of
0.7% of revenues over expenses; this turned into a 3.6%
deficit by 1981, which grew to a 4.2% deficit by 1982 (12).
When public hospitals are also teaching hospitals, they
have more political power but higher expenses. Teaching
hospitals must maintain a full range of services, even
underused ones, to give students a wide range of experience.
Whether publicly or privately owned, they do more than their
share of oupatient treatment; if they are publicly owned, it
is disproportionately used by poor patients. As Table 5-1
shows, only 15% of hospitals are teaching hospitals with
more than 400 beds, but these account for 41% of all
outpatient visits, while the two-thirds of hospitals that
are small and do not teach account for only one-third of all
outpatient visits (13). Teaching hospitals handle the more
complex, rare and severe cases of illness, which require
more intense use of resources. More of their work is done
by or for the benefit of students, which slows it down and
also requires more resources, particularly for diagnostic
purposes.
Teaching hospitals have always charged high fees to
privately insured patients, to pay for teaching expenses and
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TABLE 5-1 Hospitals and their outpatient visits by whether
they are teaching or nonteaching hospitals
CHARACTERISTICS
NONTEACHING:-
< 400 REDS
40()+ BEDS
TEACHING:
400 BEDS
400+ BEDS
HOSPIT ALS*
NUMBER PERCENT
1, 7!54
89
384
TOTAL
/7
15
15
100
VISITS
NUMBER PERCENT
37)61.9,772
3,175,539
2 0,49,404
37,726,036
91 ,870 ,75 1.
3
4
22
41
100
* Only hospitals with outpatient departments having
1 0 or more visits per year, who reported their
cost data to the American Hospital Association, are
included in this table.
Source: Mary G. Henderson and Fay L. Hannon, "Cost
Elements in Alternative Settings," in Ambulatory Care:
Problems of Cost and Access. Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1984, p. 182.
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also to subsidize the poor patients who were needed as
cooperative "teaching material". It has been supposed all
along that the cost of a visit to a hospital outpatient
department (OPD) was higher than that to a private
physician's office: recent investigations have discovered
that there is indeed a difference, and it is due mostly to
higher salaries, more staff, and services provided in OPDs
that are not provided in offices, such as research (14). In
large hospitals, the costs of noncounterpart services have
been estimated as about $4.79 of an average total charge of
$49.41 per visit (15).
Teaching hospitals currently receive extra compensation
from Medicare for their higher costs, and they often have
good reputations and state-of-the-art services that attract
better-paying patients than other public hospitals. Still,
public teaching hospitals have the highest costs of any type
of hospital, and some of them are starting to restrict the
care they give to the uninsured who are not in need of
emergency treatment (16).
The financial troubles of public teaching hospitals may
soon worsen, because in the system the federal government
is developing to use in compensating hospitals for
outpatient visits under Medicare, there is not yet any
provision for teachi-ng expenses (17). Also, because of their
more limited access to capital markets, public teaching
hospitals may have trouble maintaining their facilities well
enough to compete with private teaching hospitals.
OTHER TYPES OF HOSPITALS
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Forprofit hospital chains are the ones most discussed
in the news, which is not surprising: these firms
consciously market their product, and one effective way of
marketing is to get free media coverage for events like
Humana's artificial heart transplants. Because of
publicity, the growth of forprofit hospital chains may be
receiving more attention than it deserves. These hospitals
only own 9. of nonfederal hospital beds, which share is only
up 1.2% since 1978 (18).
However, their effect is concentrated in the South and
the West of the U.S.: for the five largest for-profit
chains, 70% of their hospitals are in the South and 20". in
California (19). Investor-owned chains frankly consider
themselves responsible to shareholders rather than sick
people. Some will officially treat emergency charity cases
if they own the only hospital in a community, but the
boundaries of the "community" and the definition of
"emergency" are up to them to define (20).
Nationally, the for-profit chains have been successful
at keeping out unprofitable patients. They do very little
charity care and their share of Medicaid patients varies
with how closely its reimbursement approaches that of other
third-party payers in any particular state (21). They also
are able to resist demand for unprofitable services. In
services on which they just about break even, like blood
transfusion, they supply about the same number of units per
day as the average hospital. Therapeutic radiology, which
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operates at a loss, is rarely offered by for-profit
hospitals. Overall, however, they supply services at higher
prices and in greater quantities per patient and per
admission than voluntary hospitals do (22).
Their greatest impact on the health-care system may be
their style of management, which voluntary hospitals are
starting to copy in their competition with each other (23).
Hospital administrators are putting a new emphasis on
choosing which services to offer based on which will draw
the most paying patients: sports medicine is a moneymaker
and outpatient psychiatry is not (24). Some hospitals are
signing preferred provider agreements, in which they receive
all the business of members of a group under contract in
return for charging them reduced prices. This further
decreases cross-subsidization, raising the costs for
patients not in such arrangements.
Another trend that shows the imprint of the for-profit
chains is the increased use of contract management by
hospitals suffering financial problems. While only about
1000 hospitals were investor-owned in 1980, another 300
voluntary hospitals were managed by for-profit hospital
corporations (25). Hired managers can now be linked to any
of the increasingly complicated aggregations of health-care
facilities, for profit or not.
Contract managers affiliated with large organization
can use the parent organization's market power on behalf
of their client. Humana, Inc., which owns 3 of the 4
hospitals in Louisville, Kentucky, recently took over the
management of the fourth hospital--a large, urban public
teaching hospital that had been losing money for several
years. Humana's success in making a $1 million profit in its
first 16 months as manager has been covered by many
journalists, but I only found one mention of how they had
achieved it: they negotiated payments for care of the
indigent that were 95% of the rate they charged private
patients, which was considerably higher than their
costs (26). The payments come from a $20 million trust fund
obtained from the city, county and state governments. Once
the $20 million runs out, Humana has agreed to contribute
its own money to the fund.
An area where the impact of investor-owned chains is
greater than their share of beds might warrant is that of
capital investment. For-profit chains are attractive to
investors, given their annual profits of about 20% in the
past few years. The health-care industry has been doing a
lot of borrowing: its long-term debt jumped 95. from 1981 to
1983, with much of that going to finance takeovers (27).
One of the largest mergers outside of the oil industry may
have been due to the importance of access to capital at low
interest rates for hospitals. The New York Times attributed
the merger of Hospital Corporation of America, the largest
forprofit hospital chain and the largest buyer of health
care supplies after the federal government, with American
Hospital Supply Corporation, also the largest firm in its
field, to HCA's need to improve its debt-to-equity ratio
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from 56:44%, which it would have been this year, to
38:62% (28).
Public and private nonprofit hospitals now have to
compete with for-profit hospitals for scarce capital, and
their debts are increasing. They cannot sell stock in
themselves., so they must borrow to raise capital. Their
share of outstanding tax-exempt bonds rose from 7.6% of the
tax-exempt bond market in 1980 to 11.7% in 1983; this
resulted in a rise in the value of tax-exempt hospital bonds
outstanding from $3.56 billion to $9.55 billion. Standard
& Poor's is currently creating a surveillance system
specifically for identifying hospitals that are bad credit
risks because of Medicare cutbacks (29).
ALL-PAYER SYSTEMS
Since 1983, four states have been granted waivers from
the system under which the rest of the nation's providers
are reimbursed for Medicare. These four states--Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York--each have their own
systems of regulation which differ from the national system
in two major ways. They limit reimbursements from all third-
party payers, not just Medicare, and they have some
provision for covering free care and bad debt.
Their experience suggests that competition might be
less fierce under a national system with those two
features. Limiting reimbursement from all-payers means that
the differential is narrowed between patients covered by
government programs and private insurers. This makes
government patients less unattractive, widening the pool of
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patients providers can market their services to, making a
truly competitive situation more feasible.
In New Jersey and Maryland, an allowance for
uncompensated care is built into the rates for all
hospitals. In these two states, uncompensated care is
distributed fairly evenly among hospitals. In New York and
Massachusetts, hospitals with particularly high volumes of
uncompensated care receive extra reimbursement; this means
that although most hospitals try to avoid indigent patients,
there are a few that welcome them; in Massachusetts, the
public hospital of last resort in Boston is on a more solid
financial footing now, under rate regulation, than it had
been for many years (30).
It is cost-effective for government to concentrate its
dependents in as few facilities as possible, so that it will
have enough purchasing power with those facilities to
influence their prices. The disadvantage of concentration is
that such facilities may come to specialize in treating
unprofitable patients, which can mean practicing medicine
that is inferior, particularly in its responsiveness to
patients' emotional needs; in Chapter 3 we saw how
compliance with doctors' orders, and through it medical
outcome, can suffer from such a lack of responsiveness.
THE SUCCESS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION IN HOLDING COSTS DOWN
Since 1980, actual government health care spending has
continued to rise each year, but as Figure 5-1 shows, the
rate at which it is rising has decreased. State and local
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governments cut the rate of their rise first, in 1981; the
following year their rate of spending increase rose when the
federal government cut back sharply on its share of costs.
In 1983, both state and federal levels showed a decline in
their rates of spending increase (31).
From 1977 to 1982 Medicare's hospital bills rose by 18%
annually, on the average, while all hospital bills were
rising by 14.6%. In 1983, the Medicare increase to
hospitals was only 10%, which is much closer to the overall
hospital spending increase of 9.1% (32). Last year hospital
admission rates dropped by 5%, and average hospital
occupancy rates dropped to 68% nationwide, from a 1980 level
of 76% (33). After increasing by an average of 3.5% each
year from 1974 to 1982, the number of patient-days of those
over 65 years of age increased by only .1% in 1983 (34).
However, when the health care system is constrained in
one area it expands in another, like a balloon. While
Medicare's hospital costs were being contained, its
physician bills rose by 17.6% in 1983, which was half again
as high as the overall rise in physician bills (35). Last
fall, the federal government announced its intention to
regulate Medicare reimbursement to physicians for visits to
their patients in the hospital under the same DRG system
used for all other bills of inpatients. Now it seems that
more services are being performed on an outpatient basis,
especially by physicians, either in offices or in the
growing number of freestanding facilities, each offering a
narrow range of services, which are now competing with
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hospitals (36).
In industries whose high startup costs bar entry to
the field of competition, there is a familiar pattern in
which a period of price competition, which eliminates weak
contenders, is followed by an oligopolistic situation in
which a few large producers cooperate among themselves to
keep prices up while they compete only on the basis of
advertising claims. It is possible that hospitals will
follow this pattern; already 35" of them are in some form of
linked system (37).
If this does happen, the only costs that will be
successfully contained will be those for services which have
been removed from the hospital setting. The barriers to
entry into the office-based physician's practice and the
freestanding clinic are still low enough to allow
competition among them to survive. From 1980 to 1984, the
number of freestanding clinics approximately doubled, to
249 (38).
Figure 5-2 shows that, since 1981, the rate of increase
in health spending has decreased for both public and private
payers. A sign of the effectiveness of government regulation
is that the rate of increase in government spending has been
less than that of private spending during that time (39).
A comparison of states with DRGs only for Medicare with
the four states in which charges to all payers are regulated
could be expected to show private costs in the all-payer
states rising at a slower rate than in the Medicare-only
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states, if the regulation was effective. Unfortunately,
there is not even agreement yet as to whether all-payer
systems have saved or wasted Medicare funds.- The report by
Johns Hopkins for the four states indicates they have saved
Medicare about $1 billion, because their overall costs are
rising 4 to 6 percentage points less than those of other
states (40). The report prepared for the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) by the Federation of
American Hospitals estimates average costs per hospital
admission in the all-payer states at $3,300, while in other
states, the corresponding cost was $2,600. According to the
HCFA, this discrepancy resulted in unnecessary Medicare
spending of $340 million in 1982 alone (41).
A survey of hospital administrators shows that most of
them expect a prospective payment system to be extended
beyond Medicare to all third-party payments (42). The all-
payer states which are not using the DRG system are
scheduled to start using it in 1986. The expectation of
hospitals under both kinds of regulation that they will soon
be living under the other kind may further blur the
distinction between the effect of all-payer regulation and
that covering only Medicare.
THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION ON ACCESS TO CARE
Medicare is offering less attractive payments for
specific services, but it is still available to everyone who
has always been entitled to it. In 1981 and 1982, state
governments responded to the growth of their share of
Medicaid bills by restricting their definitions of who was
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eligible for it, and for what types of services (43). There
has been a lot of opposition to this on behalf of the poor,
the providers who care for them, and county and municipal
governments who are left with the remaining costs. A number
of court decisions have affirmed the responsibility of state
and local governments for the medical care of the indigent
(44). State officials are now considering expanding access
to care again, to be financed by Medicaid, state or local
government revenues, or state pools of hospital
revenues (45).
I have been referring to a category called
"underinsured," in which I include the uninsured, Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries, and people with inadequate
private insurance, particularly of the kind that is limited
to major inpatient procedures. This is a hard category to
measure because Medicaid varies from state to state, and the
inadequacy of private insurance varies with the service
needed. A 1982 national survey approximates this category
with the functional definition, "families refused care for
financial reasons" (46). The characteristic that most
distinguishes this group from all underinsured is that
"families refused care" had to have had a member, probably
sick, who sought care during the previous year. In Figure
5-3, this group is compared with uninsured adults and the
population as a whole. This shows that both uninsured adults
and families refused care for financial reasons resemble the
general population in being mostly urban, white, employed,
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and at least high school graduates. The largest difference
is the poverty of nearly half those refused care and more
than half of the uninsured, compared to the general
population, of which less than one quarter are poor. More
surprising is the fact that nearly 80'4 of families refused
care for financial reasons had insurance, which must have
been inadequate for their health care needs.
It would not be very expensive to give medical coverage
to a large share of the uninsured because most of them are
not very sick. Employers can legally exclude, from their
insurance plans, workers who are under 25 years old, have
worked less than three years for the firm, or are
nonresident aliens. Not surprisingly, the most likely people
to be uninsured are 18 to 24 years old, work for only part
of the year, and live in the south and west (47).
Many local governments are considering extending
medical coverage to indigent children and pregnant women,
hoping that this will keep their own costs down, because
these are the two demographic groups for whom the evidence
for the cost-effectiveness of preventive medicine is most
convincing (48). Immunizations can prevent most childhood
illnesses now, and prenatal care has been estimated to save
about two to ten dollars for each dollar spent on it,
because the lack of it appears to result in an increased
rate of low birth weight infants who often can only be kept
alive by the extremely expensive technology of neonatal
intensive care (49). A similar group that is already on
Medicaid, that of AFDC mothers and their children, has been
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found to generate only about 25% of Medicaid spending
although they make up 66% of program beneficiaries (50).
When underinsured patients seek care, all hospitals
with emergency facilities are supposed to provide at least
enough emergency care to stabilize the patient before
transfer. This is not a firmly estqablished legal principle,
however, and the phenomenon called "dumping," or "economic
transfer," appears to be growing.
There are three varieties of dumping: direct refusal
of care, inappropriate referral, and that resulting from
disposition problems (51). The most clearcut is the direct
refusal of care to patients who lack insurance if they
cannot pay a fee or deposit before admission. Even some
public hospitals are turning away patients who are not
emergency cases (52).
In Illinois, Medicaid only covers the first $500 of
hospital expenses. Private hospitals there deny Medicaid
patients all inpatient care, all outpatient care except
renal dialysis, chemotherapy, and burn treatment, and all
drugs except those required to maintain life (53). As the
local public hospital of last resort, Cook County Hospital
had 6000 patients transferred to its emergency room from
other hospitals in 1984, an increase of 500% from 1979.
Unfortunately, emergency cases often need followup care. For
the last two years, 400 patients were referred to its
General Medicine Clinic each week, although the clinic could
only accept 120. No one knows what happened to the others,
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or what will happen to all the referrals now that the
clinic can no longer handle any new patients (54).
Many states place responsibility for indigent care on
counties, which has led to disputes when patients cross
county lines for care. They have to do so, in many cases,
because their own counties have no free care available (55).
The distinction between direct re+usal of care and
inappropriate referral is as vague as the legal obligations
of hospitals to provide care to the underinsured. Some
hospitals prefer to tell patients that appropriate
specialists are not available, or that the public hospital
has better facilities; sometimes the local ambulance service
knows better than to bring underinsured patients to a
private hospital (56). Within the same hospital, different
caregivers may have different criteria for admission. In Los
Angeles County, physicians who investigated the medical
outcome of economic transfers to the local public hospital
reported the case of:
a 36-year-old uninsured Hispanic man who was found
after a beating and taken to a private hospital
where he lapsed into a coma. The private hospital
chart documents that two neurosurgeons refused to
see the patient despite urgent requests from the
emergency room physician. After transfer, the
patient was found to have a fractured skull and
cerebral contusions. He did not regain
consciousness (57).
Disposition problems arise when a patient needs long-
term care less intensive than that provided by an acute-care
hospital, but the patient has no coverage for it or there
are no places open in extended-care facilities. Under the
DRG system of Medicare payments, hospitals have an incentive
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to shorten the patient's length of stay, because they are
compensated a fixed amount for each admission, however long
the length of stay. Since the DRG system was introduced, the
average length of stay for patients over 65 has fallen from
9.4 to 7.5 days (58). In New York, however, where hospitals
are compensated by the day rather than by the admission, the
average length of stay of over-65 patients is 13.9
days (59). The need for long-term care is so acute that over
three-quarters of chief executive officers of hospitals are
planning to add or expand a home health care service (60).
A North Carolina public health official claims that
home care providers and nursing homes are now getting
patients too early, and that they are not staffed to deal
with the sicker patients being referred to them by hospitals
now. It would be in the states' interests to verify whether
this is true, because these early discharge placements shift
costs from Medicare to Medicaid, where the states must pay a
share (61).
QUALITY OF CARE
For patients with enough insurance to gain access to
the health care system, the competition that results from
cost containment has broadened the range of available
services. Cost containment itself has improved quality where
it coincides with objectives of the consumer health
movement. To insured patients, the most threatening aspect
of rate regulation may be that it sometimes uses the same
people to monitor quality and quantity of services used.
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On the state level, quality and quantity of care for
Medicare hospital inpatients are being monitored by Peer
Review Organizations (PROs). These were created by Congress
to replace Peer Standards Review Organizations (PSROs),
which ended in 1983. Each state has a PRO, usually composed
primarily of physicians, often from the old PSROs. Each PRO
must sign a contract with the federal Department of Health
and Human Services, in which it sets 8 objectives: 3 are to
be related to limiting unnecessary hospital use and 5 are
to monitor quality of care. They are intended to focus on
areas in which hospitals or physicians vary widely in their
practice patterns (62).
Like DRGs, the PROs do not yet deal with outpatient
care. It is hard to imagine how the federal government will
enforce a prospective payment system for office-based care.
If it succeeded in creating an incentive for physicians to
use fewer resources, it is even harder to imagine how it
would then monitor quality of care in the office setting.
- PROs have at least two reasons to judge their fellow
physicians by strict standards. Their contracts are for two
years only, with renewal contingent on how satisfied HHS is
with their success at achieving their objectives. HHS
threatens to supplant them with PROs from the insurance
industry, so they can rationalize their strictness by the
logic that however strict their review is, insurers would
be even stricter.
New York State is under review by a PRO, even though it
is not regulated by DRGs, but by its own all-payer system.
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Under current regulation, New York hospitals are reimbursed
by the day, rather than by the admission. Since last
November, when its review process began, the PRO has
disallowed 10.6'4 of the Medicare bills in the state, and
13.9. of those in New York City. One of their objectives is
to reduce the average length of stay of Medicare patients in
the state from 13.9 days to something closer to the 7.4 day
national average (63).
In order to see whether quality of care is being
maintained, it is helpful to see how individual health care
facilities train and motivate people to follow cost
containment guidelines. Physicians are the hardest people
for health care bureaucrats to control, so it could be
expected that the first resources whose use administrators
try to cut would be those not controlled by physicians.
The first thing that administrators cut back on is
labor costs. Although the nurse-to-bed ratio affects
patient care directly, changing it does not interfere with
physicians' decisions. In community hospitals nationwide,
both nonprofit and investor-owned, the ratio of full-time
nurses to staffed beds is down (64). A University of
Maryland study found that higher use of part-time nurses led
to a faster turnover among full-time nurses, who were
burdened by a larger share of administrative and teaching
tasks because the part-time nurses were unfamiliar with
hospital procedures (65).
Some changes administrators have made have long been
. 1.9
standard practice by management in other
stretching out maintenance and vendor
maintaining lower levels of inventory,
industries, such as
payment schedules,
and joining with
other facilities in buyers' groups (66). These decisions
are easy for administrator to implement because they do not
involve trespassing on medical territory.
Once they have to make changes that involve medical
decisions, administrators can legitimate them if they can
attribute them to something other than the desire to contain
costs. Many are explained as improvements in care, for the
escribed below.
companies, and
standards for
are quicker
They must first be accepted by
then by physicians or whoever sets
providers .of the innovation.
to endorse innovations which
ase their practice than those which take away th
ts. Thus the professional organization wh
sents surgeons has endorsed outpatient surgery, wh
given its members the option of opening their own
ry centers (67). The association represent
tricians and gynecologists has not endorsed the use
ing centers employing midwives, although t
senting public health doctors has (68).
Some of the most dramatic changes in the health c
system under cost containment can be described
concessions to the consumer health movement:
1. The use of nonphysician substitutes for
physician labor:Health activists encourage this
not because it is cheaper, but because physician
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substitutes are less professionally distant from
patients and more qualified to deal with aspects
of illness which do not interest physicians.
2. The substitution of outpatient for inpatient
care: Day surgery, in which the patient goes home
on the same day as the operation, is now 35-407. of
all surgery (68). Outpatient care is preferred by
health activists because it is less intimidating,
less disruptive of the patient's life, and it
exposes the patient to the risk of hospital-caused
illness for a shorter time.
3. The use of community-based facilities instead
of centralized institutions. These are preferred
if they are responsive to community pressures;
among other things, this means that they must be
welcome in the community. They are intended to
integrate the patient into everyday life as much
as possible.
4. More questioning of the need for surgery: the
women's health movement, in particular, fought to
make such operations as hysterectomies, Caesarian
sections, and mastectomies less routine. One of
the few questions on which the women's health
movement took a stand explicitly favored by poor
and minority women was their surgical
sterilization, which they criticized as often
taking place without their informed consent.
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Insurance companies welcome consumer opposition to
surgery and many of them encourage patients to get
a second opinion before surgery by covering either
the second opinion or surgery performed after it
to a greater extent than surgery performed without
it.
5. more preventive health services: several
industries have sprung LIP to satisfy consumer
demand for preventive health services. Health
activists like preventive care because it can
involve self-care or self-help. Unfortunately,
consumers in search of health maintenance are
exposed to much fraud and unintentional
misinformation, some of it physically dangerous:
phony health foods, drastic diets, and incompetent
exercise instructors are common. In an effort to
find legitimate sources of preventive care,
consumers are often limited to self-help groups
and nutritionists that are connected with
hospitals, which cancels out the self-care aspect
of prevention.
6. Home health products for diagnosis and
treatment: it is easier to control the quality of
these products than of those to prevent illness,
since they can be more definitively tested. Health
activists favor them because they save patients a
visit to a physician or clinic, and the tests also
inform patients of the results as soon as
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possible, shortening the time of anxiety.
Sometimes cost containment is the only available reason
for challenging traditional medical practices. This means
doctors have to be taught how much spending their decisions
generate, and made to care about this.
Several years before DRGs came into use, a California
hospital held a two-year trial of a program intended to
teach staff doctors how to keep costs down. The doctors were
sent to lectures, received their patients' bills and price
lists of commonly used resources; and were counseled by
auditors on the relative costliness of different procedures.
This program succeeded in cutting lab costs by $65 on the
average bill of $ 3 ,000; when the program's cost was figured
in, the net saving was only $3 per patient (70). The
experiment did not last long enough to find out if
eventually program costs would decrease and saving increase.
Today hospitals seem to be instructing physicians in
cost containment more by feedback on actual choices made
than by prior theoretical instruction. The methods used
vary in which information they provide to physicians, who
provides it, and how much power the informer has over
physician behavior. Some tactics used include:
1. Giving nurses the responsiblity of seeing that
the private physicians update a patient's chart
with any new diagnosis, especially when the
patient has overstayed the average length of stay
associated with his original diagnosis This
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solves the problem of physicians not caring about
DRG regulation because it affects only
hospital bills, not their own bills.
2. Giving ancillary departments the
responsibility of questioning physicians' orders
for unusually expensive resources, and for seeing
that physicians perform time-consuming tasks in
order to get the resources.
3. Having a utilization review committee of
nonphysicians inform physicians of the
statistical norms of resource use they are
expected to follow, starting at the time of the
patient's admission.
4. Having a utilization review committee of
physicians publicly criticize patterns of
deviation from statistical norms in care that has
already been delviered, without naming the
particular physicians who have done so (71).
An interesting feature of the first three ways above is
that they all use nonphysicians to control physicians, thus
bypassing professional loyalty. An unforeseen advantage of
extending professional privileges to nonphysicians is that
they gain more authority to judge physicians' behavior. Much
utilization review is done by nurses, and in a recent
malpractice case, a nurse was accepted for the first time as
the expert witness against a physician.
The changes administrators can make that please other
personnel the most are those expanding their services,
1 L
especially in directions that do not involve capital
spending, which might be subject ot state CON review. Some
of the services in favor now are long-term care, alcohol
rehabilitation, sports medicine, and chronic pain-control.
These new services are an improvement for patients, as are
the new types of facilities which offer less red tape and
waiting than hospitals, but a wider range of services and
hours covered than solo practitioners. New facilities and
services are only profitable if they provide something that
patients want.
Unfortunately, competition also forces unprofitable
services and facilities to close down, and they may be
unprofitable not because they are underused, but because
they are overused for the low level of payment they earn.
Hospitals are eliminating services that are labor-intensive
and that draw a large share of underinsured patients, such
as pediatrics and outpatient psychiatry.
THE ROLE OF CONSUMER HEALTH ACTIVISTS
The consumer health movement has never been very well
organized because health care is a difficult issue to
organize around (72). Most people do not use health services
as part of their everyday lives, and those who do are hard
to mobilize because they are usually chronically ill or
disabled.
Those issues of the 1970s which were meant to improve
care were especially hard to use as focal points of
collective action, because their stress on patients' control
1 25f
over health was widely interpreted as individual patients'
control. The only area in which public responsibility for
health has been acknowledged is that of access to care,
which was less of a problem in the 1970's than it is now.
The ways in which patients can now influence the health
care system fall into two categories: those in which
activists can improve the care available to them as
individuals and those in which activists can improve care
for a whole category of patients. The individual methods
cannot do much to improve access: assertive behavior by
individual patients does not change hospital policy about
providing charity care. Emphasis on the responsibility of
the patient for his own health can hurt the case of those
seeking access to care, as when an official of the
Department of Health and Human Services can claim that
smoking, drinking, and drug abuse by pregnant women are more
important factors than federal budget cuts in the increase
in infant mortality in certain areas (73).
Activist patients are most likely to know about those
beliefs of the consumer health movement that have been
incorporated into conventional wisdom, as doled out by
newspaper advice columnists and radio talk-show doctors.
Patients who feel that they are responsible for their own
health will probably start by following advice that is
easily available and uncontroversial, such as to be
assertive with physicians, get a second opinion before
surgery, take fewer medicines rather than more, or eat a
low-fat, high-fiber diet. Individuals who can put more
effort into their health care can draw on resources built
up by self-help and self-care advocates, who have created a
number of information and referral serivces. These are not
very well publicized or linked with one another, so a
patient must make some effort to find them. Like the
People's Medical Society and the Boston Women's Health
Collective, they provide facts on diseases and those who
treat them. They differ from most consumer information
sources in that they must disclaim any intention of making
recommendations that could be interpreted as prescribing
treatment or endorsing practitioners because they are
legally barred from doing so. A recent federal regulation
giving consumers access to PRO data also set a $1,000 fine
for divulging information about individual physicians (74).
The problem of access to care is possible to tackle on
the level of collective action. Health care activists of
the 1970s made several demographic groups aware that their
members had a particular interest in health issues: women,
the elderly, and the disabled are examples of these. Now
there are organizations, like the National Women's Health
Network, that specialize in such a group's health care
needs, and the more general organizations deal with health
among other member interests.
The individual actions that have the greatest group
impact are those which establish legal precedents that
expand the rights of other patients. In 1973, the Joint
Committee of Accredited Hospitals adopted a Patient's Bill
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of Rights, which they never enforced, or even required the
facilities they accredited to endorse (75). Recently, an
Arkansas judge cited that bill of rights as the basis for
his ruling that private non-profit hospitals owed the same
emergency care to indigents as public hospitals did (76).
S
ALLIES IN SEEKING ACCESS TO CARE FOR THE UNDERINSURED
During the 1970s, large urban public teaching hospitals
were exactly what the equal health advocate opposed. Their
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outpatient clients received fragmented care from a
constantly changing staff of inexperienced doctors (77).
Their inpatients might be treated by expert faculty members,
but were also used in demonstrations for students, and the
faculty members, as academics as well as physicians, had two
kinds of professional authority over clients. a
Now these same large public teaching hospitals are
often the only providers in a region who will treat the
medically indigent. They are treating a clientele with a
much higher concentration of underinsured people. Their
prestige and political connections help them to stay
financially viable, and their commitment to professional
standards and traditional opposition to bureaucratic
authority give them the incentive to maintain high standards
of care for an unprofitable clientele. The need to keep
large public hospitals alive can be a unifying- issue for
providers who wish to keep caring for the underinsured. The
National Association of Public Hospitals recently filed suit
against the head of the federal Department of Health and
Human Services on the grounds that Congress ordered HHS to
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give special consideration to hospitals serving a
disproportionate share of Medicare and medically indigent
patients. Its co-plaintiffs include three health-care
workers' unions, a nurses' professional organization, the
Catholic Health Association., and the California Association
of Public Hospitals (78).
Unions have a strong interest in opposing cost
containment because there have been so many layoffs at
hospitals. Although the shift from inpatient to outpatient
services means there will be more jobs available in
physicians' offices and freestanding facilities, these jobs
do not pay as well hospital outpatient departments and their
staff-to-patient ratio is lower (79). Humana, Inc.,
attributes much of its financial success to the fact that
labor costs make up on 36% of its budget, as opposed to the
nationwide average of 51% (80).
Nurses, unionized or not, have particularly strong
reasons to support demands for access to care.A survey of
community hospitals showed that over 85. of hospital chief
executives thought nursing was an important area to cut, not
because it was inefficient, but because it was such a large
part of the labor force (81). Nurses are having a very
difficult time trying to turn themselves into professionals,
because they have no exclusive control over a body of
knowledge and skill. For the same reason, their efforts to
unionize have suffered from the ability of the hospital to
parcel out their functions among other workers, since they
have no exclusive ones (82). The nursing specialties that
have been most successful at gaining prerogatives formerly
limited to physicians are those that allied themselves with
patients. As one nursing journal advised, "Nurse-
midwives...have shown us the power of combining forces with
consumers in changing health practices and delivery
patterns. Nurses in other areas might follow their
example" (63).
Last summer, the largest nurses' strike ever took place
in Minneapolis-St. Paul, a city with a large number of
competitive prepaid health plans. Six thousand nurses from
15 hospitals struck for six weeks in protest of the layoffs
of senior staff in order to replace them with cheaper junior
staff (84).
Another category of providers whose interests make them
favor increased access to care, especially in public
teaching hospitals, is that of medical students, interns,
and residents. During the late 1960s and the 1970s,
housestaff in large cities were forming unions, which won
the right to strike against voluntary hospitals in 1974
(85). Residents and interns provided the bulk of care to
inner-city patients, and felt they were overworked and
received too little training in return for their service.
Their demands broadened to include patient-care issues such
as increased nursing and clerical staffs, more translators,
and new equipment. In New Yorka group called the Committee
of Interns and Residents brought together a coalition of
unions and community groups around joint worker-patient
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demands. A housestaff union in Los Angeles struck for and
won a $1.1 million patient-care fund, half of which came
from a foregone increase in their salaries (86).
Medical students, residents, and interns have the same
professional motives as other physicians to resist
bureaucratic tampering with their standards of care. Layoffs
of nurses and other staff add to their workload. Those of
them who work in public hospitals are also the practitioners
most directly in contact with the patients who suffer from
cost containment. It is therefore possible that there will
be a renewal of housestaff activism in support of patient-
care demands.
Local and state governments may also support demands
for increased access to care if they are being billed for
inefficiently delivered charity care. It is not in their
interests to have most charity care done in large, expensive
teaching hospitals. Some state governments are trying to
link permission for expansion by private hospitals to
increased provision of care for the poor. Massachusetts
required four major private teaching hospitals to agree to
increase their share of Boston's charity care in return for
the right to perform liver transplants (87). New York State
negotiated for four years to get a teaching hospital to
agree to repay permission to expand by helping a small
public hospital in Harlem to improve its patient care and
teaching, by opening new wings offering several unprofitable
services, and by making itself more available to provide
0
emergency care by building a new emergency room and joining
the city's ambulance system (88).
State governments only have this power over hospitals
if they retain their Certificate of Needs programs. Several
states have already let them expire: Arizona received
applications for 1200 new beds in the week after it let its
CON program lapse (88). Most states still have CON
programs, but some are contracting rather than expanding
their powers (89).
RECOMMENDATIONS
This is an appropriate time for consumer health
activists to concentrate on expanding access to care and
maintaining quality of care, rather than improving quality
of care in the directions favored by consumer activists.
Competition has made providers eager to offer services
patients want; the quality of care issue is not whether
innovations will be tested, but whether they will retain
their original value when produced by cost-conscious
providers. Access problems seem to be confined to a
minority of patients, but they are potentially problems for
the majority. Most Americans are only a job away from being
uninsured. If states did extend Medicaid to the unemployed,
Medicaid and Medicare coverage no longer are enough to
guarantee access to care. Even many people with private
insurance do not have enough to cover catastrophic illness
or the well-publicized, very expensive techniques now being
developed for treating common illnesses.
Many people may also find that they need but cannot
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find or pay for extended care because, for the first time
since the Medicare and Medicaid began, hospitals are in a
hurry to discharge patients; during the intervening years, a
much larger share of the population began to live in
households in which there is no family member who can (
provide extended home care. For the first time, the majority
of Americans live in one or two-member households, and the
majority of married women work. S
State governments seem to be willing to encourage new
supplies of extended care; consumers can try to direct
government funding away from for-profit providers and toward
such community-based alternatives as respite care and tax
deductions for people caring for invalids at home. Consumers
can also encourage state governments to enforce Hill-Burton
obligations and to keep community health centers and small
community and rural public hospitals open, because these are
less expensive providers of charity care than teaching
hospitals.
On the community level, they can see that the
unprofitable services--obstetrics, pediatrics, emergency
care and outpatient psychiatry--remain available in some
facility that serves the underinsured. The federal
government can be encouraged to extend cost controls to all
payers and to outpatient services as soon as possible, to
discourage inefficient distortions that have probably
developed under the current limited system.
Consumers can probably rely on governments and public
4
hospitals to collect data that will be useful in monitoring
quality of and access to care. Local infant morbidity and
mortality rates are already closely watched and have
inspired policy changes. Physicians in public hospital
emergency rooms are keeping track of transfer rates. The
rate of hospital readmissions from long-term care can reveal
whether patients are indeed being discharged from acute care
too early.
0
Health activists themselves will probably have to
continue to assemble any comparative data they wish to use
to judge the quality of care offered by individual
providers. As small public hospitals and community health
centers close, consumers are the ones who will have to
arrange any remaining integration of medical services with
informal social support systems, such as those including
clergy and ethnic healers.
The consumer health movement is used to issues faced by
laypeople confronting experts. The broader consumer
movement has more experience with the problems of
individuals confronting large organizations. If they can get
the right of patients to some standard of health care firmly
established, health activists may find the experience of
other consumer groups more useful in demystifying medical
insurance coverage and big health-care business than it ever
was in demystifying medicine itself.
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